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RETHINKING VIRTUAL CURRENCY REGULATION IN
THE BITCOIN AGE
Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith

Abstract: This Article investigates an increasingly important yet under-developed body of
law: regulation of virtual currency. At its peak in March of 2014, the daily volume of Bitcoin
transactions in United States dollars exceeded $575,000,000. The growing mainstream
acceptance of Bitcoin, however, is best illustrated by the growing number of leading
merchants that have decided to accept Bitcoin payments. While Bitcoin’s rise as an
alternative payment method is well-chronicled, Bitcoin’s impact extends further due to its
use as an investment vehicle and its ability to spur the growth of an industry of Bitcoin-based
businesses. Despite increasingly widespread use, Bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) have
largely operated without the burden of regulation. Why? Like the potentially transformative
innovations that preceded Bitcoin, virtual currency raises unique challenges for which
existing legal models may be unprepared. As policymakers struggle to catch-up, the effort to
develop an appropriate regulatory regime for virtual currency is at a critical juncture.
The response in the United States has thus far involved regulatory bodies acting
independently to clarify the treatment of virtual currency under a variety of different laws
designed to regulate traditional payment systems, financial services, and investments. This
Article argues, contrary to this approach, that a narrow focus on the technical application and
extension of existing law creates a deficient regulatory regime. Instead, we suggest that
policymakers should: (1) engage the various agency stakeholders to promote crosscommunication; (2) think more globally about the wide spectrum of issues arising from
virtual currency; and (3) embrace the unique and distinct characteristics of virtual currency.
In support of this proposition, we show that refocusing on the collection of policy goals
advanced by existing law offers policymakers an additional tool to aid in the development of
a comprehensive, cohesive, and appropriately-scaled virtual currency regulatory model.
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INTRODUCTION
No longer relegated to relative anonymity, the seemingly limitless
potential of decentralized virtual currencies such as Bitcoin has captured
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the imagination of the public at large. 1 Bitcoin was once little known
and had limited practical value because few people were willing to
accept it as a form of payment. However, the unique characteristics of
Bitcoin along with the perceived benefits of Bitcoin over payments in
traditional government-backed currency have contributed to its rapid rise
in popularity. 2 Although still far from being universally accepted,
Bitcoin has seen both an increase in its users and widespread growth in
the number of merchants (both online retailers and brick and mortar
establishments) willing to accept it as a valid form of payment. 3 As
Bitcoin has become more mainstream, established merchants, including
Dell, Expedia, and Overstock.com, have started to accept Bitcoin as an
alternative to traditional payment methods such as credit/debit cards. 4
The popularity of Bitcoin has also led to the growth of an industry of
virtual currency based businesses designed to facilitate Bitcoin
transactions among users. Bitcoin Exchanges, Bitcoin Banks, Bitcoin
ATMs, Bitcoin Wallets, and Bitcoin payment gateways have all entered
the marketplace. 5 Although their business models vary, these third-party
service providers can allow for: (1) the exchange of Bitcoin into
traditional currency; (2) the purchase and sale of Bitcoin; (3) the online
storage of Bitcoin; (4) the transfer of Bitcoin to others; and (5) the
acceptance of Bitcoin payments.6
The potential of Bitcoin, however, is not solely limited to serving as a
payment alternative. The fluctuation in value of Bitcoin over time has
led many to view it more as a commodity, asset class, or security ripe for
speculative investment. 7 The price of one bitcoin reached a high of over
$1200 in November 2013 with current prices in July of 2014 in the $575

1. See, e.g., Clayton Browne, Bitcoin Heists Rise Alongside Profile of the Virtual Currency,
VALUEWALK (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/11/bitcoin-heists-rise-along-profilevirtual-currency/; infra Part I.
2. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 1; infra Part I.
3. See Ian Kar, What Companies Accept Bitcoin?, BENZINGA (Feb. 3, 2014, 4:26 PM),
http://www.benzinga.com/economics/14/02/4276066/what-companies-accept-bitcoin.
4. See, e.g., Shawn Knight, Dell Joins the Growing List of Major Retailers Now Accepting
Bitcoins, TECHSPOT (July 18, 2014), http://www.techspot.com/news/57461-dell-joins-the-growinglist-of-major-retailers-now-accepting-bitcoins.html.
5. See, e.g., Yuliya Chernova, New Use for Bitcoin: Compensation for Open-Source Software
Development, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/01/
22/new-use-for-bitcoin-compensation-for-open-source-software-development/; infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., Chernova, supra note 5; infra Part II.
7. See, e.g., Joe Light, Should You Invest in Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2013, 10:40 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304607104579212101356897382;
infra
Part II.
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range. 8 Despite its volatility, investors have engaged in buying, selling,
and trading of Bitcoin in an attempt to achieve a return on investment. 9
Even though Bitcoin has achieved a material level of mainstream use
as a form of remittance and is increasingly purchased as an investment,
virtual currencies have largely operated free of regulation or legal
oversight. 10 The growing popularity of Bitcoin, however, has rightfully
attracted the attention of policymakers globally. 11 Efforts to understand
the risks associated with decentralized virtual currencies such as Bitcoin
and to implement an appropriate response highlight the unique
challenges that face policymakers in creating a consistent, cohesive, and
appropriately-scaled legal and regulatory framework for virtual
currencies. 12
Attempts to simply categorize Bitcoin into existing regulatory
constructs have proven to be difficult. 13 Most commonly, the discussion
surrounds categorization of Bitcoin as money or property. 14 Although
Bitcoin shares similarities with both money and property, its unique
characteristics result in a materially different risk profile.15 Accordingly,
regulation that is tailored to traditional financial services or investment
methods may fail to account for the unique attributes of Bitcoin and may
8. See, e.g., Robert Wood, Bitcoin’s $13.50 to $1,200 Eleven Month Climb, FORBES (Dec. 2,
2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/12/02/bitcoins-13-50-to-1200eleven-month-climb-now-taxes/; Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23,
2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/.
9. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Cryptocurrency: The Bitcoin, A Virtual Medium of Exchange,
Could Be a Real Alternative to Government-Issued Money—But Only If It Survives Hoarding by
Speculators, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/review/425142/
cryptocurrency/; infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., Gregory Ferenstein, Senator Warns Unregulated Bitcoin Leaves Americans Holding
a Valueless Currency, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/senatorwarns-unregulated-bitcoin-leaves-americans-holding-a-valueless-currency/; infra Part III.
11. See, e.g., Matthew Braga, As Merchants Embrace Bitcoin, Digital Currency Still Struggles for
Regulatory Approval Worldwide, FIN. POST (Jan. 20, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/2014/
01/20/bitcoin-currency-merchants-regulators-2014/?__lsa=592b-fc15; Bob Adelmann, Government
Is Taking Steps to Regulate Bitcoin, NEW AM. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/
economy/sectors/item/16985-government-is-taking-steps-to-regulate-bitcoin; infra Part III.
12. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE FEATURES
PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY (2012), available at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf; infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams, Recent Development in the Regulation of Bitcoin Under State
and Federal Securities Law, HUNTON & WILLIAMS (Mar. 2014), http://www.hunton.com/files/News/
2916457b-30fb-4e69-9fe9-4025bfd06520/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7d70afb5-0954-420a-883a43a7aa307ce6/Developments_in_the_Regulation_of_Bitcoin_under_Securities_Laws.pdf; infra Part IV.

14. See, e.g., John D. McKinnon & Ryan Tracy, IRS Says Bitcoin Is Property, Not Currency,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2014, at C2; infra Part IV.
15. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12; infra Part III.
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also be ill-suited for extension to decentralized virtual currency. 16
As a decentralized virtual currency, Bitcoin is electronically created
and stored. 17 Moreover, Bitcoin does not enjoy the backing of a
government or central bank like traditional currencies such as the United
States Dollar. 18 While these characteristics allow for some proclaimed
advantages over traditional payment methods, they also raise unique
regulatory concerns and considerations. 19 For example, personal account
information is not transmitted in connection with a Bitcoin transaction,
which provides a greater degree of anonymity than credit/debit card
payments. 20 Although this may be attractive to some customers and is
touted by Bitcoin as contributing to greater protection from identity
theft, the increased anonymity may make it more difficult to identify,
prevent, and investigate criminal activity. 21 Policymakers, therefore,
must tackle these challenges in understanding both the functionality and
risks of decentralized virtual currencies in order to create an appropriate
legal and regulatory framework. 22
To date, global regulatory responses have exhibited little consensus.23
Some countries have simply opted to ban Bitcoin. 24 Others have
remained silent leaving the treatment of virtual currency under existing
laws unsettled. 25 In contrast, the United States has taken an incremental
approach to clarifying the legal and regulatory landscape for virtual
currency. 26 Regulatory bodies and legislators at both the federal and
state levels have taken steps to clarify the applicability of varying but
distinct laws that may implicate virtual currencies.27
16. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12; infra Part III.
17. See Jeff Clark, Bitcoin: Decentralized Virtual Currency, DATA CENTER J. (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.datacenterjournal.com/it/bitcoin-decentralized-virtual-currency/; infra Part I.
18. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 17; infra Part I.
19. See Why Use Bitcoin?, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/why-use-bitcoin/
(last updated Feb. 29, 2014); Alex McAdams, Why I Use Bitcoin, and Why You Should Too,
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/02/09/why-i-usebitcoin-and-why-you-should-too.aspx; infra Part I.
20. See Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 19; McAdams, supra note 19.
21. See Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 19; McAdams, supra note 19.
22. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12; see also infra Part III.
23. Braga, supra note 11; see also infra Part III.
24. Braga, supra note 11; see also infra Part III.
25. Braga, supra note 11; see also infra Part III.
26. See, e.g., Adelmann, supra note 11; infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams, supra note 13; DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO
PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013) [hereinafter
“FIN-2013-G001”]; infra Part III.
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Taken as a whole, regulation in the United States has been narrowly
focused on establishing how virtual currencies will be treated under
existing law. 28 Various regulatory bodies have acted independently to
provide guidance as to the treatment of virtual currency under the laws
within their purview. 29 While this pragmatic and patch-work process has
resulted in a degree of increased clarity, such a narrow approach to
developing virtual currency regulation may result in: (1) a lack of interagency communication such that the resulting regulatory framework
may be fragmented and lack cohesion; (2) difficulty in developing
regulation tailored to the unique characteristics and risks of virtual
currency; and (3) a failure to give sufficient consideration to the full
breadth of regulatory issues raised by decentralized virtual currency such
that the resulting regulatory framework may suffer from an unintended
oversight in scope 30
This Article seeks to advance the discussion about the proper
regulation of decentralized virtual currencies in the United States.
Specifically, we contend that examining the regulatory objectives
advanced by existing laws, as applied to virtual currency, provides
valuable supplementary guidance to policymakers in the ongoing
process of developing an appropriate legal framework. 31 Moreover, this
Article investigates the differing regulatory rationales underlying a
selection of traditional laws applicable to currency, financial services,
investments/securities, and banking. 32 While these laws did not
contemplate virtual currency and, in some cases, are ill-equipped to
accommodate regulation of virtual currency, we find them to be
instructive.
We conclude that while existing laws may be inappropriate for rote
extension to virtual currency, the goals underlying these laws are often
implicated to varying degrees in the context of virtual currency. As such,
the regulatory goals of many existing laws justify the regulation of
virtual currency. 33 The challenge for policymakers, however, is to
divorce themselves from the confines of existing regulation in order to
think creatively about how to enact new or modified regulatory
requirements that would advance these same regulatory objectives in the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra Part IV.
See supra note 27.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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context of virtual currency. 34 Ultimately, we suggest that such an
exercise would help foster the creation of a more effective legal
framework regardless of whether policymakers pursue the enactment of
comprehensive new legislation specific to virtual currency or the
continuing development of a system of distinct laws applicable to virtual
currency. 35
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the development of
virtual currency and the unique functionality of Bitcoin, which paved the
way for more widespread acceptance. Part II examines the growth of
Bitcoin in the marketplace and explains how the perceived advantages of
Bitcoin over traditional payment methods have been attractive to users
and merchants. Part III evaluates global regulatory responses to the risks
associated with virtual currency and describes how the U.S. approach of
incremental clarification by independent agencies may lead to the
creation of a deficient virtual currency legal framework. Part IV
considers whether the policy goals of a cross-section of federal and state
laws would be served by regulation of decentralized virtual currencies
and argues that such an analysis should form a component part of an
informed, thoughtful and comprehensive dialogue about the appropriate
framework for U.S. regulation of virtual currency. A brief Conclusion
follows.
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY AND
BITCOIN

As a type of virtual currency, Bitcoin is a medium of exchange that
(1) is electronically created and stored, 36 and (2) lacks the backing of a
government authority, central bank, or a commodity like gold. 37 Like
traditional currency, virtual currencies such as Bitcoin can be used to
purchase goods and services from any person that is willing to accept it
as a form of payment. 38 However, virtual currencies can be distinguished
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. The term “virtual currency” lacks a universally agreed upon definition. However, in 2012, the
European Central Bank defined it as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and
usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual
community.” EUR. CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 5 (2012), available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf. Similarly, in 2013
the U.S. Treasury defined it as “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some
environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency.” FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27.
37. Joshua J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the
Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2013).
38. See id. at 1120 (stating that Bitcoin’s “value fluctuates with respect to the value of other
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from traditional forms of currency, such as the United States dollar or
any other national currency, because virtual currencies do not have the
status of legal tender. 39 Legal tender is a form of payment recognized by
law that must be accepted by a creditor towards satisfaction of a debt or
financial obligation. 40 Therefore, virtual currencies may operate like
legal tender in some circumstances but lack the status of legal tender
because no person is legally obligated to accept a virtual currency.
Bitcoin is not the only virtual currency or even the first virtual
currency to be introduced to the public. In fact, a number of virtual
currencies predate Bitcoin. 41 However, each ultimately failed to reach
Bitcoin’s current level of popularity and mainstream acceptance.42 While
virtual currencies are nothing new, Bitcoin was developed and
introduced in a way that allowed it to obtain a material level of use in the
marketplace where other virtual currencies languished. As discussed in
greater detail below, a variety of Bitcoin’s unique characteristics have
been touted as being particularly attractive to users and may have helped
Bitcoin obtain wider acceptance than other virtual currencies. In short,
Bitcoin’s technology appears to provide users with a satisfactory
solution to the double-spending problem that plagued other virtual
currencies operating without a trusted third-party clearinghouse. In
doing so, Bitcoin was also able to provide perceived benefits to users,
including lower costs, increased anonymity in transactions and
insulation from inflation and government manipulation.
A.

Solving the Double-Spending Problem
As noted above, Bitcoin is a type of virtual currency. 43 More

currencies, and . . . can be spent anywhere a merchant is willing to accept them”); Paul Krugman,
Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 7, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/09/07/golden-cyberfetters.
39. FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27 (providing interpretive guidance with respect to distinguishing
virtual currency from “real” currency for the purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN’s
regulations).
40. James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 84 (1887) (“In law, whatever is legal
tender is money; but it is not true that whatever is money is legal tender . . . . the control over this
whole subject which is given to Congress by the Constitution.”). Thus, in general, legal tender must
be issued by an authorized national body such as the United States Treasury. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103
(2012) (defining legal tender).
41. See Richard Satran, 6 Virtual Currencies that Went Bust, US NEWS (May 13, 2013),
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/slideshows/6-virtual-currencies-that-went-bust/1.
42. Id.
43. The terms “digital currency” and “virtual currency” have both been used (sometimes
interchangeably) to describe Bitcoin. See Danny Bradbury, Is Bitcoin a Digital Currency or a
Virtual One?, COINDESK (Mar. 19, 2014, 6:02 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-digital-
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specifically, Bitcoin is a crypto-currency, 44 a form of money that relies
on encryption or cryptography (instead of a central authority such as a
national bank or government) to control its creation. 45 As the first widely
accepted decentralized crypto-currency, Bitcoin revolutionized virtual
currency through its innovative use of technology to provide a seemingly
reliable process of authorizing and authenticating Bitcoin transactions
while protecting against double-spending of the same Bitcoin.
A study of the development of Bitcoin and how it functions highlights
the innovative approach used to solve the double-spending problem.
Although most have speculated that work on the Bitcoin concept was
well underway by at least 2007, 46 the first formal announcement would
not come until November 2008, when a paper entitled Bitcoin: A Peerto-Peer Electronic Cash System was published online under the name
Satoshi Nakamoto. 47 The paper detailed a proposal for a “purely peer-tocurrency-virtual-one/ (“Is bitcoin a virtual currency, a digital currency, or both? And why does it
matter? In press reports, it’s often referred to as both.”). There is some debate on the subject of
which term is most appropriate. See id. Because regulators within the United States have adopted
the term “virtual currency” in their preliminary guidance on Bitcoin, that term will be used
throughout this Article. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-36 (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Newsroom/IRS-Virtual-Currency-Guidance (IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency
Is Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions
Apply) (“The Internal Revenue Service today issued a notice providing answers to frequently asked
questions (FAQs) on virtual currency, such as bitcoin.”). The choice to use the term “virtual
currency,” however, is intended only to be a semantic one and should not be considered a comment
on whether Bitcoin should properly be understood as “digital” or “virtual” currency.
44. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1120 n.9.
45. As will be further explicated below, this is an aspect of Bitcoin that is meaningfully distinct
from traditional currencies. The creation of traditional currencies, such as the United States dollar, is
based upon the will of a central authority or governing body that might be unpredictable or subject
to political forces. In the United States for example, the Federal Reserve is granted the authority to
“print money” and put it into circulation. In contrast, the creation of bitcoins is predictable, because
the rate of their entry into the market has been coded into the program in advance. See JERRY BRITO
& ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS (2nd ed. 2013), available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer_v1.3.pdf; Doguet, supra note 37, at 1119
(“Currency . . . is exactly like religion. It’s based entirely on faith. This is especially the case with
Bitcoin; no government, corporation, or commodity (like gold) backs the digital currency.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
46. Fran Berkman, An Interactive History of Bitcoin, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 11, 2014,
10:47 AM), http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/an-interactive-history-of-bitcoin20140211-32dt4.html (“According to legend, Satoshi Nakamoto began working on the Bitcoin
concept in 2007.”).
47. It is commonly believed that “Satoshi Nakamoto” is a pseudonym. Id. (“While he [Satoshi
Nakamoto] is on record as living in Japan, it is speculated that Nakamoto may be a collective
pseudonym for more than one person.”); see also Wallace, supra note 8 (“In November 1, 2008, a
man named Satoshi Nakamoto posted a research paper to an obscure cryptography listserv
describing his design for a new digital currency that he called Bitcoin. None of the list’s veterans
had heard of him, and what little information could be gleaned was murky and contradictory. In an
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peer version of electronic cash [that] would allow online payments to be
sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial
institution.” 48 The idea for the system of virtual currency included in
Nakamoto’s paper was not new. In the early 1990s a number of virtual
currency systems, including E-cash, bit gold, RPOW, and b-money, had
already been launched. 49 What made the Bitcoin proposal unique was
Nakamoto’s innovative approach to addressing what has come to be
known as the “double spending problem.”
The “double spending problem” is an inherent difficulty that any
system of virtual currency must face and it can be simplified in the
following manner: “If a [virtual] dollar is just information, free from the
corporeal strictures of paper and metal, what’s to prevent people from
copying and pasting it as easily as a chunk of text [and] ‘spending’ it as
many times as they want?” 50 Physical currencies have a manifest “builtin” solution to this double spending problem: if a consumer exchanges a
physical dollar for an apple (or any other good or service) then, absent
illegal activity such as counterfeiting, they are no longer in possession of
the dollar and, therefore, cannot spend that dollar again to buy a another
apple from another vendor. Virtual currencies, which have no physical
manifestation, however, cannot rely on this sort of built-in solution.
Most virtual currencies have sought to address the problem by
“involv[ing] . . . a central clearinghouse to keep a real-time ledger of all
transactions [involving the virtual currency].” 51 Implementing a central
clearinghouse can addresses the problem of double spending because
any fraudulent transactions will be immediately logged and prevented;
however, it can only be effective at doing so if the third-party is or
should be trusted by the users of the currency. 52
online profile, he said he lived in Japan. His email address was from a free German service. Google
searches for his name turned up no relevant information; it was clearly a pseudonym.”).
48. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin; A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Nov. 8, 2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
49. Wallace, supra note 8.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Consider, by analogy, the check clearinghouse system used by banks in the United States.
Prior to the widespread use of clearinghouses, banks would settle debts between each other via
direct courier. That is, checks were physically delivered from one bank to another for settlement. In
order to eliminate the inefficiencies of settling debts on a bi-lateral basis, bankers began to meet at
one central location, known as a clearinghouse. This permitted banks to effect settlement “on the net
difference between cheques exchanged (i.e. sent to and received from the other banks) rather than
on the gross value of the cheques, transaction by transaction.” See History of the Cheque, CHEQUE
& CREDIT CLEARING CO., http://www.chequeandcredit.co.uk/cheque_and_credit_clearing/history_
of_the_cheque/the_clearing_-_early_days/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). However, because the
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Nakamoto’s proposal was unique because it eliminated the need for a
third-party clearinghouse by turning over the authority to maintain a
ledger of transactions to the users of the currency themselves. This could
be achieved, Nakamoto argued, in the following manner: in order to use
the currency, every Bitcoin user would be held responsible for running
an application that generates an individualized pair of cryptographic
keys. 53 One is private and stored on the user’s computer, while the other
is made public. 54 When a transfer of bitcoins is initiated, the amount of
the transfer is submitted to the network of Bitcoin users encoded with
the recipient’s public key. 55 The recipient then “accepts” the transfer by
submitting the same amount encoded with his or her private key. 56 The
sender, finally, acknowledges the transfer by signing the transaction with
his or her private key, thereby informing the network that bitcoins
formerly located in his or her account now have a new owner. 57 In this
way the double spending problem could conceivably be remedied
without the use of a third-party clearinghouse.
As these encrypted transactions occur across the Bitcoin network,
every user is continually “downloading a log of all transactions that
have . . . taken place [across] . . . the network.” 58 These publicly
available, albeit encrypted, records are analyzed, voluntarily, by certain
Bitcoin users (known as “miners”) who authenticate and approve
transactions. Authenticated blocks of transactions are then submitted to a
“public ledger,” known as the “block chain.” This authentication process
serves to remedy the “double spending” problem. Because every
transaction is logged in the “public ledger” a bitcoin cannot be spent
twice. Any attempt at a “second spend” of a bitcoin would be invalidated
by Bitcoin miners who would be unable to authenticate the transaction
or add it to the block chain. Before the transaction is confirmed, it would

functioning of the clearinghouse relied upon mutual trust between its participants and, occasionally,
fear that a particular bank might soon become insolvent resulted in banks refusing to honor the
checks drawn upon the accounts of that bank and threatened the validity of the system. Id. In order
to address these fears, in the United States established the Federal Reserve System, which served as
a nation-wide clearinghouse backed by the guarantee of the federal government. Id. Of course,
virtual currencies cannot rely on the legitimacy of the federal government and instead must assuage
their customers fears of insolvency based upon the reputation of the private entity administering the
clearinghouse.
53. Bitcoin Under Pressure, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Nov. 30, 2013, at 17.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1126.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also Nakamoto, supra note 48.
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be recognized as duplicative of a transaction already in the “block chain”
and would not be authenticated. Therefore, Bitcoin offered a seemingly
reliable way to resolve the double-spending problem that plagued other
virtual currencies without involving a third-party clearinghouse. In doing
so, users of Bitcoin could theoretically be assured of the reliability of the
system without having to evaluate the trustworthiness of a third-party
clearinghouse. So long as the system operated reliably and users retained
confidence in it, Bitcoin would appear to have overcome a primary
obstacle to the wider acceptance of a virtual currency as an alternative to
traditional currency.
B.

Benefits of Bitcoin

Assuming the efficacy of Bitcoin’s solution to the double-spending
problem, Bitcoin could conceivably offer users a viable alternative to
traditional currency. In fact, as a decentralized virtual currency, bitcoin
is often touted as offering a number of advantages over traditional
currency. The most commonly cited benefits of bitcoin are: (1) lower
costs and fees, (2) fewer risks for merchants, (3) increased anonymity
for users, (4) increased speed and ease of transfer/payment, and (5) less
susceptibility to government manipulation and inflationary pressures. 59
Some of these benefits are derived directly from Bitcoin’s unique
solution to the double spending problem—that is eliminating the need
for a third-party to mediate transactions. For example, consider the
amount of time that is required for funds to be deposited into a bank
account via check or wire transfer. Banks commonly hold money for
days while waiting for the drawee bank to verify that the drawer actually
has the funds available. Because Bitcoin’s cryptography eliminates the
need for this type of third-party verification, Bitcoin has the advantage
of increased speed and sometimes instantaneous transfer. 60 Of course,
more modern payment methods such as debit/credit cards also offer
instantaneous transactions, but these methods require the use of thirdparty payment networks that charge merchants usage fees, up to two
percent to three percent per transaction. 61 In contrast, because Bitcoin
transactions can occur directly between buyer and seller, transaction

59. See, e.g., Bitcoin Project, What Are the Advantages of Bitcoin?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/
en/faq#what-are-the-advantages-of-bitcoin (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Why Use Bitcoin?, supra
note 19; McAdams, supra note 19.
60. Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 19.
61. McAdams, supra note 19.
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costs are minimized. 62
Some of Bitcoin’s other touted benefits, however, are more directly
attributable to Bitcoin’s status as a virtual currency. Bitcoin, like other
virtual currencies, does not require its users to provide any personal
information prior to making a purchase and, as such, purports to limit the
risk of identity theft or fraud for consumers. 63 Bitcoin also serves to
protect merchants from consumer fraud, because Bitcoin transactions are
non-reversible. 64 This is an advantage for merchants who experience a
high volume of credit card chargebacks (effectively the reversal of a
transaction) resulting from customers who make a purchase and
fraudulently challenge the transaction with their credit card company. 65
Finally, like other virtual currencies, Bitcoin is viewed by some as
being less susceptible to inflation and artificial government manipulation
of the currency’s value. As such, Bitcoin advocates tout its ability to
mitigate a widely held concern with respect to traditional state-backed
currencies. As noted by one commentator:
When Nakamoto’s paper came out in 2008, trust in the ability of
governments and banks to manage the economy and the money
supply was at its nadir. The US government was throwing
dollars at Wall Street and the Detroit car companies. The
Federal Reserve was introducing “quantitative easing,”
essentially printing money in order to stimulate the economy. 66
In contrast, Bitcoin’s process for creating and introducing new bitcoins
into the system is not subject to such arbitrary swings.
As opposed to traditional currencies that can be created on the whim
of a government agency, new Bitcoins enter the market through a
process known as “mining.” “Every time a Bitcoin transaction is made,
the transaction is broadcast to the entire network.” 67 Any user of the
Bitcoin network can monitor these transactions to ensure that they are
valid through the use of “mining” software that is available for anyone to
download at no cost. Valid transactions are then recorded and bundled
into “blocks” which can be submitted the network’s “public ledger”
known as the “block chain,” which “contains every valid transaction

62. Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 19.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1126; Nakamoto, supra note 48.
67. Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money
Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 532 (2014).
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made since the first block was created on January 3, 2009.” 68 Before a
block can be added to the “block chain,” a miner’s computer is required
to correctly solve “a difficult mathematical problem, called a ‘proof-ofwork.’” 69 The difficulty of the algorithm adjusts itself such that, on
average, “one block is created every ten minutes.”70 This mining process
limits the total amount of currency that enters into the Bitcoin market
and renders non-market fluctuations impossible. New bitcoins only enter
the market after the addition of a “block” to the “block chain.” A block
is merely a record of a recent Bitcoin transaction. However, the creation
of “blocks” occurs at a predictable rate. This is ensured by the increasing
difficulty of the “proof of work” required before a “block” can be added.
As such, it is known as a mathematical certainty the rate at which new
blocks, will be created. When a new block is added to the block chain, a
predetermined amount of new bitcoins then enter the market as an award
to whomever submitted the block; “the size of each block
bounty . . . halve[s] every 210,000 blocks—first from 50 Bitcoins to 25,
then from 25 to 12.5, and so on” 71 until the pre-determined cap of 21
million Bitcoins is reached. In theory, this would render the currency
immune from inflation and political manipulation. To many, this
represents a more predictable and trustworthy system than the Federal
Reserve having discretion to choose when to print money. 72
In sum, it appears that Bitcoin was developed to provide an
innovative solution to a problem that stifled the public acceptance of
prior virtual currencies. Assuming the reliability of Bitcoin’s solution to
the double-spending problem, Bitcoin’s promises of a low-cost
decentralized currency that is independent of the government may be
attractive to users who might now view it as a viable alternative to other
payment methods such as cash, checks, and debit/credit cards. The
foregoing notwithstanding, Bitcoin’s staying power depends upon its
level of acceptance in the marketplace.
II.

BITCOIN IN THE MARKETPLACE

In order to ascend from a little-known theoretical virtual currency to a
viable alternative to traditional payment forms, Bitcoin must achieve a
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Wallace, supra note 8; see also Nakamoto, supra note 48.
See, e.g., PEDRO FRANO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING AND
ECONOMICS 5 (2015); Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 19.

10 - TuMeredith - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

RETHINKING VIRTUAL CURRENCY

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

285

critical level of adoption by users and acceptance by merchants. Early
Bitcoin transactions highlight the virtual currency’s humble beginnings.
Nonetheless, Bitcoin has seen growth in both the number of users and
the prevalence of Bitcoin transactions.
Informal transactions in Bitcoin began in January of 2009 when
Nakamoto, himself, “mined” the first block of transactions added to the
public ledger. 73 The first Bitcoin transaction was for the delivery of two
Papa John’s pizzas (which cost 10,000 bitcoins currently valued at over
$5.9 million). 74 Another early transaction was for the purchase of alpaca
wool socks. 75 Some users even began giving away bitcoins to increase
circulation. 76 Bitcoin has since grown to support a “base of
approximately 10,000 users, including several hundred merchants
that . . . accept [Bitcoin] . . . as . . . payment” processing more than
$300,000 worth of Bitcoin transactions every day. 77 Moreover, the value
of a bitcoin has also grown exponentially, reaching a high value of
$1200. 78
As a new “start-up” currency, the number of merchants accepting
bitcoins in exchange for goods or services is admittedly small when
compared to traditional currency. Only a relatively small fraction of all
monetary transactions involve bitcoins, and the use of bitcoin is far from
mainstream. Nonetheless, Bitcoin has attained more attention and wider
spread adoption than any other virtual currency. 79 In fact, an assessment
of Bitcoin in the marketplace highlights its versatility. Although many
applications have been suggested, 80 Bitcoin is most commonly used: (1)
73. Wallace, supra note 8.
74. Katherine Mangu-War, Meet the $2 Million Bitcoin Pizza, REASON (Apr. 9, 2013, 3:04 PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2013/04/09/meet-the-2-million-bitcoin-pizza.
75. Arella Brown, Alpacas: The Unofficial Mascot of Bitcoin, COINDESK (May 31, 2013, 2:12
PM), http://www.coindesk.com/alpacas-the-unofficial-mascot-of-bitcoin/.
76. See, e.g., Max Raskin, Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-04-10/meet-the-bitcoin-millionaires.
77. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1136.
78. See Wood, supra note 8; Wallace, supra note 8.
79. See Arthur Gervais et al., Is Bitcoin a Decentralized Currency? (2013), available at
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/829.pdf (noting that “Bitcoin has witnessed a wider adoption and
attention than any other digital currency proposed to date”).
80. See, e.g., BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 14–15 (suggesting the Bitcoin service might
be used as an alternative to credit cards for small businesses seeking to avoid fees, as a means to
combat poverty and oppression, and as a stimulus for financial innovation); id. at 15 (Some
countries have even “turned to Bitcoin to evade the harmful effects of capital controls and centralbank mismanagement.” Argentina, for example has “adopted Bitcoin in response to the country’s
dual burdens of a 25 percent inflation rate and strict capital controls.”); Rob Wile, Bitcoin Can Be
the New Western Union, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
bitcoin-can-be-the-new-western-union-2013-12 (suggesting that Bitcoin can facilitate the
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to purchase goods and services online, 81 (2) to purchase goods and
services from “brick and mortar” stores, 82 and (3) as an investment
opportunity. 83 In addition, the growing acceptance of Bitcoin has
resulted in the development of various third-party services designed to
facilitate the use of Bitcoin. Regardless of the reasons for Bitcoin’s rise,
one thing is certain. Bitcoin has captured the imagination of the public
and has reached a material degree of acceptance. Thus, while not as
widely accepted as legal tender, Bitcoin has ascended to something more
than a little known and little used virtual currency.
A.

Bitcoin Payments Online

Because Bitcoin was designed to facilitate Internet commerce and the
online transfer of funds, 84 it is not surprising that the most well-known
use of Bitcoin is as a means of payment for online purchases.85
Customers may use Bitcoin to pay for goods and services from any
online retailer that accepts it. 86
Some online retailers have a business model based on the acceptance
of Bitcoin as the exclusive method of payment. All purchases from these
online retailers must be made with Bitcoin and Bitcoin alone. These
online retailers are ostensibly seeking to leverage the lower transaction
costs of Bitcoin as compared to traditional payment forms such as
credit/debit cards. For example, The Bitcoin Store accepts only Bitcoin

international transmission of funds and domestic remittances).
81. Gloria Goodale, The Rise of Bitcoin: Is It a Solution or a Menace?, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 23,
2013, 9:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/rise-of-bitcoin-2013-11.
82. Id.
83. Wile, supra note 80.
84. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1134.
85. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 4.
86. For the customer, the checkout process when using bitcoins to complete a purchase from an
online retailer is not dissimilar from the checkout process when using a PayPal account or a credit
card. The customer simply selects the item, initiates the retailer checkout procedure and enters their
public encryption key (instead of their credit or debit card information) to complete the transaction.
Depending on the site, the customer may also be required to enter the key of the company to be paid
and the amount to be paid. This initiates a transfer of Bitcoin to the online retailer in much the same
way that money might be transmitted between two traditional bank accounts through the use of a
customer’s debt or credit card information. For a retailer, the process of accepting a bitcoin from a
customer is also comparable to accepting a payment through the use of a credit or debit card.
Instead of money being transferred into the retailer’s bank account, bitcoins are transferred into the
retailer’s online Bitcoin account. Transferred bitcoins can then be used to purchase products from
any other merchant that accepts the currency or be exchanged for traditional currency, such as
United States Dollars. See, e.g., PayPal v. Bitcoin, BLOCKCHAIN (Dec. 8, 2013),
https://blockchain.info/wallet/paypal-vs-bitcoin (contrasting the PayPal and Bitcoin services).

10 - TuMeredith - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

RETHINKING VIRTUAL CURRENCY

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

287

and, as a result of the decreased transaction cost, “sells thousands of
consumer electronics at discounted prices.” 87 Other online retailers that
exclusively accept Bitcoin include Bitcoin Blaster (which also sells
electronics) and the Bitcoin World Market (which sells a wider range of
offerings to bitcoin users). 88 In sum, the growth of Bitcoin and its
acceptance by users has led to the development of a niche industry of
online retailers who have opened “Bitcoin Stores” where all goods are
only sold in exchange for Bitcoin.
More commonly, however, online retailers have decided to accept
Bitcoin as an alternative or supplement to traditional payment methods.
These online retailers give customers the option to pay with Bitcoin.
During the infancy of Bitcoin, the virtual currency had limited value
because few online retailers were willing to accept a little known virtual
currency with uncertain (if any) value in exchange for their goods and
services. Nonetheless, some forward-thinking, or perhaps even publicityseeking online retailers became early adopters. These early adopters,
including OkCupid 89 (an online dating service) and Virgin Galactic 90 (an
aviation company focusing on space tourism), paved the way for others,
making Bitcoin much more mainstream and valuable to its users. As of
June of 2014, over 60,000 merchants had joined the ranks of retailers
accepting Bitcoin as an alternative form of payment. 91
As might be expected, many of the online retailers that have chosen to
accept virtual currency are tech-savvy providers of “virtual goods” such
as EZTV (a provider of online streaming television services), the Pirate
Bay (a provider of BitTorret directories), 4chan and Reddit (online
message boards), Wordpress (an online blogging platform), namecheap
(a domain registration service), Lumfile and meag.co.nz (online storage
services), and Zygna (a mobile gaming company). 92 However, online
retailers that deliver tangible goods to their customers have also begun to
adopt the service, including Etsy vendors (a service that permits local
87. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 10.
88. Vitalik Buterin, Bitcoin Store Opens: All Your Electronics Cheaper with Bitcoins, BITCOIN
MAG. (Nov. 5, 2012), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/bitcoin-store-opens-all-your-electronics-cheaperwith-bitcoins.
89. Cyrus Farivar, OKCupid Says It Will Accept Bitcoin, as Currency Falls to Recent Low,
ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.arstechnica.com/business/2013/04/okcupid-says-itwill-accept-bitcoin-as-currency-falls-to-recent-low/.
90. Matthew J. Belvedere, Richard Branson: Buy Your Space Flight with Bitcoin, CNBC (Nov.
22, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101220710#.
91. Brian Patrick Eha, More Major Retailers Are Getting Ready to Accept Bitcoin,
ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/231134.
92. See Kar, supra note 3.
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merchants to sell their wares in pre-fabricated online shops), TigerDirect
(an online market for consumer electronics), and—perhaps most
famously—Overstock.com (one of the web’s largest retailers offering
merchandise ranging from jewelry to electronics).93
Overstock.com, for many, represented a turning point in the
credibility of the Bitcoin as a more mainstream virtual currency.
Coinbase, which runs an online wallet and payment processing firm, for
example, labeled Overstock.com’s decision to accept Bitcoin as “the
largest retail Bitcoin implementation to date.” 94 Within twenty-one hours
of the announcement that Overstock.com would begin accepting Bitcoin,
the company sold more than $124,000 in goods via bitcoin
(approximately four percent of its daily revenue). 95 This overwhelming
response has led many to predict that the online market for Bitcoin users
will likely grow even further as other retails will “be forced to take
bitcoin at some point, as the market is growing by 30% per month.” 96
As predicted, some major United States companies have started to
follow the lead of Overstock.com with Dell 97 (a computer and
technology company), Expedia 98 (an online travel agency), and Dish
Network 99 (a satellite television provider) announcing that they would
accept Bitcoin payments. Moreover, others that have not yet officially
adopted Bitcoin are actively evaluating and considering it as a viable
payment method. For example, at the 2014 annual shareholder meeting,
Ebay’s CEO acknowledged his belief that “Bitcoin will play a very
important role in the future” and revealed that Ebay is “actively
considering” how it might enable Bitcoin as a payment option. 100 As
such, it appears that larger and more well-known online retailers are
beginning to accept Bitcoin and attitudes have begun to shift such that
Bitcoin is increasingly viewed as having the potential to serve as a
mainstream payment alternative.
93. Id.
94. Danny Bradbury, Overstock.com Becomes First Major Retailer to Accept Bitcoins,
COINDESK (Jan. 9, 2014, 9:15 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/overstock-opens-bitcoin-sales/.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Sydney Temper, Dell Begins Accepting Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/dell-begins-accepting-bitcoin/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
98. Jane Genova, Expedia Accepts Bitcoin—Why?, PAYMENTWEEK (June 18, 2014, 3:34 PM),
http://paymentweek.com/2014-6-18-expedia-accepts-bitcoin-why-4923/.
99. Kevin Xu, Dish Network to Accept Bitcoin Bill Payments, PAYMENTWEEK (May 29, 2014),
http://paymentweek.com/2014-5-29-dish-network-to-accept-bitcoin-bill-payments/.
100. Jenn R. Ma, EBay Contemplates Accepting Bitcoin, PAYMENTWEEK (May 22, 2014),
http://paymentweek.com/2014-5-22-ebay-contemplates-accepting-bitcoin-4748/.
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One of the reasons that retailers have increasingly adopted Bitcoin is
the perceived advantages that it offers over traditional payment methods.
Bitcoin is attractive because it is billed as a lower-cost and lower risk
alternative to credit/debit cards. 101 Retailers can “process Bitcoin with a
minimal fee of just 1 percent (compared with the up to 3.5 percent that
some credit cards charge).” 102 In addition, accepting Bitcoin allows
merchants to avoid “fraudulent ‘charge-backs,’ or consumer-initiated
payment reversals based on a false claim that a product has not been
delivered.” 103 Bitcoin also allows retailers to receive access to customer
payments more quickly. Bitcoin payment processing allows retailers to
convert bitcoins to United States dollars within twenty-four hours
whereas credit card processing typically requires forty-eight to seventytwo hours to complete. 104
While the claimed benefits of Bitcoin have likely contributed to the
growing number of merchants willing to accept it, Bitcoin is not without
risk. Some have expressed concern that merchants may be rushing to
accept the virtual currency without fully understanding their potential
exposure. Questions have also been raised about the security of the
Bitcoin system and its ability to reliably protect against theft. 105 With
that said, the primary risk stems from volatility in value. On more than
one occasion, the value of Bitcoin has fallen by fifty percent in a twentyfour-hour period. 106 As such, merchants embracing Bitcoin run the risk
of accepting payment in a form that quickly becomes less valuable.
Thus, as noted by Greg Shvey, co-founder of The Genesis Block (a
virtual currency research group), the challenge presented to merchants is
to “take advantage of . . . the [currency’s] efficiencies without
[incurring] any of the risks.” 107

101. Sara A. O’Brien, Retailers See Big Upside by Accepting Bitcoins, NYPOST (Dec. 28, 2013,
9:10 PM), nypost.com/2013/12/28/nyc-retailers-see-big-upside-by-accepting-bitcoins/.
102. Id.
103. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 11.
104. O’Brien, supra note 101.
105. Will Weisser, Why Security Issues May Chronically Hinder Bitcoin Adoption, TRIPWIRE
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/security-issuesmay-chronically-hinder-bitcoin-adoption/.
106. AFP, Bitcoin Recovers After Slumping on China Bank Measures, DAILY NATION (Dec. 19,
2013),
mobile.nation.co.ke/business/Bitcoin-recovers-after-slumping-on-China-bank-measures/-/
1950106/2118250/-/format/xhtml/-/9m4va5z/-/index.html; Andy Greenberg, Bitcoin’s Price
Plummets as Mt. Gox Goes Dark, with Massive Hack Rumored, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2014, 1:56 AM),
www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/02/25/bitcoins-price-plummets-as-mt-gox-goes-darkwith-massive-hack-rumored/.
107. O’Brien, supra note 101.
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In sum, the state of Bitcoin acceptance by retailers highlights several
issues impacting the potential for widespread use of decentralized virtual
currency. Bitcoin may offer certain advantages over traditional payment
methods, making it attractive to merchants as a viable payment
alternative. However, those advantages may come with associated risks
that are not yet fully understood due to the relative infancy of Bitcoin.
Regardless of the pros and cons of accepting Bitcoin, a review of the
marketplace suggests that Bitcoin is gaining traction. Larger and more
well-established merchants are starting to accept Bitcoin. As a result, the
use and acceptance of Bitcoin as a method of payment for the purchase
and sale of online goods and services is becoming more widespread.
B.

Bitcoin Payments at “Brick and Mortar” Stores

Although Bitcoin is a “virtual currency,” its purchasing power is not
limited to the Internet. Like online retailers, merchants that operate brick
and mortar stores have also been drawn to the perceived advantages of
Bitcoin. 108 Merchants, both small and large, have started to accept
Bitcoin at store locations.109 Although the number of stores that accept
Bitcoin does not come close to rivaling those that accept more traditional
payment methods, this growth provides further evidence of the inroads
that Bitcoin continues to make in becoming an increasingly mainstream
alternative payment method.
Small businesses were the earliest adopters of in-store Bitcoin
payments with owners often citing the lower transaction costs as the
primary factor in their decision to adopt the currency. In April 2013,
EVR, a New York “gastro-lounge,” became the first store to accept
Bitcoin. 110 EVR’s owner, Alex Likhtenstein, noted that his decision to
accept Bitcoin was motivated, in part, by the exceptionally low
transaction cost. Tim Ferguson, the owner of Rise bakery, the first store
in North Carolina to accept Bitcoin, also cited lower transaction costs as
his primary justification. 111
Low transaction costs are not the only characteristic of Bitcoin that
appeals to store owners. Some merchants have found that accepting
Bitcoin can attract new customers who are looking for places to spend

108.
109.
110.
111.

BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 11.
Goodale, supra note 81.
O’Brien, supra note 101.
Kirby Wilson, Tom Ferguson Becomes First Durham Business Owner to Accept Bitcoins,
DUKE CHRONICLE (Feb. 26, 2014), www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2014/02/26/tom-fergusonbecomes-first-durham-business-owner-accept-bitcoins.
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their bitcoins. Daniel Lee, owner of two eateries Lean Crust Pizza and
the Oxford Kitchen, as well as a small convenience store and nail salon,
offers a ten percent discount to customers paying with Bitcoin in his
stores. 112 Lee pointed to the discount as the reason why new customers
have traveled to his stores and noted that some have become regular
customers. 113
The acceptance of Bitcoin is not, however, limited to smaller business
or “mom and pop shops.” Larger businesses are also accepting in-store
Bitcoin payments. 114 These businesses include nationally and
internationally recognized brands including: Subway Sandwiches, 115 the
Real Estate Firm of Brown Harris & Stevens, 116 Richard Branson’s
commercial space venture Virgin Galactic,117 and various McLaren and
Lamborghini car dealerships. 118
Like online retailers, the owners of brick and mortar stores are
attracted by Bitcoin’s promises of advantages over traditional payment
forms (e.g. lower costs, reduced risk, potential for growth and
publicity). 119 Because of these benefits, more than 75,000 merchants
have started accepting in-store Bitcoin payments. 120 Accordingly, an
owner of bitcoins is no longer substantially restricted in their ability to
spend it. Bitcoin is accepted by merchants selling a wide array of
products and services from comic books to legal services. 121

112. O’Brien, supra note 101.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Jon Aziz, Bitcoin Would Benefit from Being Boring, IDEA FACTORY (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://theweek.com/article/index/252627/bitcoin-would-benefit-from-being-boring (“And now,
some major offline chains like Subway are beginning to join online-only businesses like Reddit,
[and] Wordpress . . . in accepting the digital currency.”). Not all online retailers, however, have
started to accept digital currency. See Knight, supra note 4 (“Dell joins major retailers Dish
Network, Expedia, Newegg, Overstock and Tiger Direct in accepting bitcoins as a method of
payment. Amazon is still holding out . . . .”).
116. Roger Wu, Why We Accept Bitcoin, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:30 AM), www.forbes.com/
sites/groupthink/2014/02/13/why-we-accept-bitcoin/.
117. Jillian D’Onfro, Sir Richard Branson Will Accept Bitcoin for Virgin Galactic Space Travel,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 22, 2013, 11:32 AM), www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-for-virgin-galactic2013-11.
118. Nerman Hajdarbegovic, Lamborghini and McLaren Dealerships Drive Bitcoin Adoption in
USA, COINDESK (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/lamborghini-mclaren-bitcoin/.
119. Wu, supra note 116.
120. Mark Macdonald, 75 Places to Spend Your Bitcoins, SHOPIFY (Nov. 30, 2013),
www.shopify.com/blog/10480345-75-places-to-spend-your-bitcoins$axzz2wAu9gieV.
121. BITCOIN CITY, www.bitcoincity.us (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
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Bitcoin as an Investment

Although Bitcoin was conceived as medium of exchange to pay for
goods and services, Bitcoin is increasingly seen as a means of making
money. 122 Because bitcoin can be exchanged for traditional currencies
and experiences relatively large price fluctuations, it has become a
popular investment. 123 Some commentators have even noted that “most
Bitcoin users are acquiring Bitcoins not in order to buy goods and
services but to speculate” on its value. 124 Indeed, according to
bitcoinwatch.com, although “more than a million dollars’ worth of
bitcoins [have been] traded . . . less than half a million dollars in bitcoins
were being used in transactions.” 125 This suggests that the virtual
currency is being used primarily for investment. While volatility in the
value of Bitcoin may be viewed as a potential risk to retailers that accept
Bitcoin as payment, that same volatility is potentially attractive to
investors who seek to profit from buying low and selling high.
Accordingly, Bitcoin’s use in the marketplace is not limited serving as
an alternative payment method. Instead, Bitcoin has also developed into
an investment opportunity such that there is a growing number of
investors who buy and sell bitcoins like one might buy and sell stock or
trade traditional currencies.
Part of the reason that investors have flocked to the virtual currency is
that “bitcoin . . . has rapidly fluctuated in price.” 126 Shortly after the
currency was introduced, “the value of bitcoins jumped tenfold in five
days.” 127 To date, Bitcoin has seen a number of similarly drastic price
fluctuations. From April 2011 to June 2011, a bitcoin’s price rose from
$0.75 to $30.00. 128 By November 2011, its value plummeted to below
$2.00 before it stabilized at around $5.00 in 2012. 129 Throughout 2012,
the value of the currency again began to destabilize, rising to a value of
$15.40 in August 2012 and then dropping to $7.58 before the end of the

122. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case
Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 127–28 (2012).
123. Surowiecki, supra note 9.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kaplanov, supra note 122, at 128.
127. Surowiecki, supra note 9.
128. Timothy B. Lee, These Four Charts Suggest that Bitcoin Will Stabilize in the Future, WASH.
POST (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/02/03/these-fourcharts-suggest-that-bitcoin-will-stabilize-in-the-future/.
129. Id.
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year. 130 The following year was no different. At the beginning of 2013,
the value of a bitcoin was only $13.50. 131 Within a single month
however, the value rose to $266, and then crashed to $50.00. 132 In 2014,
the price rose from $130 to $1242, and crashed to $455 before
stabilizing at around $900. 133 These drastic and rapid price fluctuations
led speculators to believe that buying and holding bitcoins was an easy
and quick way to make a profit. 134 A shrewd investor might, given the
appropriate set of circumstances, make an investment in Bitcoin and
multiply his or her profits.
Given the possibility for large investment gains, the rise of Bitcoin
investing is not surprising. What effect this will have on Bitcoin remains
to be seen. Some have argued that “it gives people an incentive to hoard
their bitcoins rather than spend them, which is the opposite of what you
need people to do in order to make a currency successful.” 135 As such,
there is the possibility that Bitcoin investing may stifle the continued
growth of Bitcoin as a payment method. However, at least one court has
suggested that because of its similarities to traditional investments,
Bitcoin might be brought out of the unregulated “grey market” and
effectively integrated into the regulated and well-accepted securities
market. 136 Accordingly, it is possible that categorizing Bitcoin as an
asset instead of a currency, or alternatively, accepting that Bitcoin may
share traits of both an asset and a currency, may add certainty to the
legal and regulatory framework for decentralized virtual currencies.
Ultimately, one thing is certain. Bitcoin is becoming more well-known
and additional applications of Bitcoin are developing. Bitcoin’s growth
is not limited to gains in the number of users or merchants willing to
accept it as payment. Bitcoin is also becoming more widely accepted by
virtue of the increase in investors that view Bitcoin as a viable
investment opportunity.
D.

Bitcoin Services

As Bitcoin has grown in popularity, entrepreneurs have sought to
capitalize by developing a variety of services to facilitate different
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Surowiecki, supra note 9.
Id.
See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
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Bitcoin transactions. For example, Bitcoin “exchanges” provide a
mechanism for exchanging Bitcoin for traditional currencies. On
October 5, 2009, the first exchange rate for Bitcoin was published by
New Liberty Standard. Based primarily on “an equation that include[d]
the cost of electricity to run a computer that generated Bitcoins,” New
Liberty Standard assessed one United States dollar to be worth 1309.03
bitcoins. 137 This development laid the groundwork for the first Bitcoin
exchange, known as “The Bitcoin Market,” which went online on
February 6, 2010. 138 The online exchange provided users, for the first
time, with a real-time marketplace exchanging bitcoins for United States
dollars. 139 As the value and popularity of Bitcoin increased, more and
more online exchanges opened for business, the most notable of which
being the now defunct Mt. Gox. 140 To date, more than a dozen online
currency exchanges have opened for business including exchanges that
facilitate the exchange of Bitcoin for European currencies (such as
Bitmarket.eu), exchanges that facilitate the exchange of Bitcoin for
South American currencies (such as Bitcoin Brasil), and even exchanges
that focus on exchanging bitcoins for other virtual currencies (such as
VirWoX). 141
Other Bitcoin-based businesses soon followed. On May 2, 2013, the
first physical Bitcoin exchange was introduced, in the form of a Bitcoin
ATM. A Bitcoin ATM is a “kiosk . . . similar [in many ways] to [a
traditional] ATM but . . . [it] allows people to swap Bitcoin for cash, or
deposit cash to buy more Bitcoin by transferring funds to or from a
virtual wallet on their smartphones.” 142 The first Bitcoin ATM “created a
global media buzz and racked up over $100,000 of transactions in eight
days.” 143 Since that time, over ten Bitcoin ATM developers have come

137. History of Bitcoin: The World’s First Decentralized Currency, HISTORYOFBITCOIN.ORG,
http://historyofbitcoin.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Bitcoin History].
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also The History of Bitcoin, BITCOINVISION.NET, http://bitcoinvision.net/historybitcoin/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (noting that dwdollar established the first Bitcoin currency
exchange); 11 Historical Bitcoin Moments: A Pictorial Countdown of the Cryptocurrency History,
99BITCOINS.COM, http://99bitcoins.com/11-historical-bitcoin-moments-a-pictorial-countdown-ofthe-cryptocurrency-history/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (noting that the Bitcoin Market is a former
exchange).
140. Bitcoin History, supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. Jon Brodkin, Bitcoin ATM Goes Live in Albuquerque, More Coming to Austin and Seattle,
ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2014, 9:53 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/02/
bitcoin-atm-goes-live-in-albuquerque-more-coming-to-austin-and-seattle/.
143. Id.
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into existence, and installed thousands of Bitcoin ATMs in Canada,
Australia, Finland, Slovakia, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and the
United States. 144
Developers also started releasing mobile apps to facilitate the use of
Bitcoin. 145 The first of these, known as “Bitpay,” launched on June 29,
2011, and was marketed “as the first smartphone e-wallet for
Bitcoins.” 146 It allowed users to send/receive bitcoins or transfer bitcoins
from a Bitcoin wallet, using a smartphone. 147 Soon after, a number of
similar products to facilitate Bitcoin transactions were launched
including Intervex Digital’s “BitCoins Mobile,” which provided e-wallet
services to Apple iPad users and “BitInstant,” a type of “debit card” used
to access online Bitcoin accounts. 148 Developers initially faced
challenges with Apple even removing Bitcoin apps from its platform. 149
The foregoing notwithstanding, today Bitcoin app development
continues to grow, which lends further support to the view that Bitcoin is
gaining more widespread acceptance. Apple has since reinstated Bitcoin
apps after issuing guidelines demanding that such apps be in compliance
with all applicable laws. 150
A host of other Bitcoin-based businesses have also been introduced.
KnCMiner has begun to focus on supporting Bitcoin producers by
developing hardware to facilitate the process of Bitcoin mining. 151 Socalled Bitcoin Mints have started to sell real-world metal coins that can
be loaded with Bitcoin value. 152 Perhaps even more interesting, however,
was the announcement of “BoostVC,” a Bitcoin incubator that provides
funding to jumpstart up-and-coming intermediary Bitcoin service
providers. 153

144. BITCOIN ATM EXPLORER, http://bitcoinatmexplorer.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
145. Rich Trenholm, Apple ‘Stamp of Approval’ for Bitcoin Points away from Apple Currency,
CNET (June 16, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/apple-stamp-of-approval-for-bitcoinpoints-away-from-apple-currency/.
146. Bitcoin History, supra note 137.
147. Trenholm, supra note 145.
148. Bitcoin History, supra note 137.
149. See, e.g., Kaylene Hong, Apple Removes the Last Remaining Wallet App Blockchain from
the App Store, TNW (Feb. 6, 2014, 5:43 AM), http://thenextweb.com/apple/2014/02/06/appleremoves-the-last-remaining-bitcoin-wallet-app-blockchain-from-the-app-store/.
150. Paul Vigna, Blockchain’s Bitcoin App Reinstated, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2014, 9:01 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/28/blockchains-bitcoin-app-reinstated-in-apples-app-store/.
151. Bitcoin History, supra note 137.
152. Robert McMillan, Bitcoin Mint Reopens After Nastygram from Feds, WIRED (Jan. 15, 2014,
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/casascius-back/.
153. Bitcoin History, supra note 137.
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The development of an industry of businesses based wholly on
Bitcoin lends further credence to the possibility that Bitcoin will
continue to grow and eventually achieve a substantial level of
mainstream acceptance. At the very least a growing number of
entrepreneurs and investors appear willing to bet on the continued
growth of Bitcoin via the development business models that are wholly
dependent upon the ongoing success of the virtual currency.
Ultimately, a review of the market shows that use of the Bitcoin
service is becoming more widespread. Acceptance of Bitcoin as a
payment method and investment vehicle continues to grow, and the level
of popularity has resulted in an industry of businesses based solely on
Bitcoin.
III.

CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Immediately following its creation, Bitcoin largely operated free from
regulatory scrutiny. Initially, the service operated entirely outside of the
traditional financial system and had very few users. As a result it evaded
the attention of both regulators and the mainstream public. However,
Bitcoin’s popularity has forced legal and regulatory bodies (both
domestic and international) to assess the potential risks of an
increasingly mainstream decentralized currency. While the perceived
benefits of Bitcoin have enticed new users, merchants, investors, and
businesses, the innovative nature of Bitcoin also raises regulatory
concerns. Regulators, however, have seemingly struggled to decide how
and whether to regulate virtual currency. As a result, the legal and
regulatory response domestically and abroad has, to date, been varied.
The following sections will: (1) assess the impediments facing regulators
seeking to address the risks posed by virtual currencies, and (2) track the
domestic and international regulatory responses that have been
implemented in an attempt to confront the potential dangers of virtual
currencies. The foregoing notwithstanding, what is clear is that Bitcoin’s
growing acceptance has triggered legal and regulatory responses
highlighting both the concerns associated with decentralized virtual
currencies and the difficulty of establishing a consistent and coherent
legal and regulatory framework to accommodate its unique
characteristics.
A.

Potential Impediments to Regulating Bitcoin

1.

No Centralized Entity
Bitcoin, as a peer-to-peer network, lacks a centralized regulatory
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entity and Bitcoin itself is not an entity or business that can be directly
regulated. To date, a core component of financial regulation involves a
regulator’s ability to impose compliance requirements upon a centralized
entity and in turn, the centralized entity’s implementation of those
requirements. For example, financial regulation commonly imposes
requirements aimed at assisting financial regulators in identifying and
preventing illicit criminal activity. Bitcoin’s decentralized nature creates
unique problems for regulators seeking to achieve this goal because
Bitcoin lacks a centralized entity that might be able to comply with or
implement traditional anti-money laundering laws that require “due
diligence . . . monitoring and reporting suspicious activity, running an
anti-money laundering compliance program, or accepting and processing
legal requests like subpoenas.” 154 This makes Bitcoin distinct from other
virtual currencies such as WebMoney or Liberty Reserve that, although
they permit users to operate anonymously, “still operate as companies
with centralized organization capable of instituting programs to ensure
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act” and other legal requirements. 155
Moreover, as noted by Jerry Britto, a senior research fellow at George
Mason University, “the Bitcoin protocol leaves governments with no
intermediary to shut down . . . . There is no Bitcoin company to
subpoena, no headquarters to raid, not even a server to shut down.” 156
Thus, “[w]hile the state may be able to uncover the identity and punish
the parties to a Bitcoin transaction . . . it will no longer be able to prevent
those transactions from happening in the first place.” 157 In short, Bitcoin
poses potential regulatory issues because regulators lack the ability to
impose regulatory requirements upon a centralized entity that might
assist with early detection and prevention of illicit activity. Moreover,
the lack of a centralized entity means that there is no entity that can be
held accountable to users, merchants or investors for any harm that is
caused.
2.

Increased Anonymity

Like other virtual currencies, Bitcoin affords users with a degree of
anonymity that is greater than many traditional payment systems. While
the a use of cash effectively provides the user with complete anonymity
in a transaction, other traditional payment systems associate a user’s
154.
155.
156.
157.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12.
Id.
Adelmann, supra note 11.
Id.
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personal identifying information with each transaction. For example, if a
person purchases an item with a credit or debit card, the customer’s
name and other identifying information is tied to the account. 158 In
contrast, Bitcoin transactions afford greater anonymity. Although “[a]ll
Bitcoin transactions are published online . . . the “only information that
identifies a Bitcoin user is a pseudo-randomly generated Bitcoin
address.” 159 As such, Bitcoin transactions provide a greater degree of
anonymity than most traditional payment methods because the user’s
personal information is not provided in connection with each transaction.
As a result, Bitcoin has appealed to users by promising greater security
and protection from identity theft. 160
The anonymity afforded to Bitcoin users, however, adds another level
of complexity for regulators seeking to address concerns that the service
might be used to facilitate illegal activity. Traditionally, financial
regulation imposes requirements on the financial institutions that
facilitate transactions. For example, financial institutions may be
obligated to conduct background checks on their customers and/or
monitor customer transactions in order to assist with the discovery of
illicit activity such as money laundering or terrorist financing. 161 The
increased anonymity of Bitcoin transactions impedes the effectiveness of
these “customer due diligence” or “know your customer” elements of
financial regulation. 162 Even if the parties to a Bitcoin transaction are
ultimately discoverable, the increased anonymity that appeals to some
users makes it more difficult for the intermediaries who facilitate Bitcoin
transactions to effectively assist regulators with policing suspicious

158. See Bitcoin Gains Popularity: Why More Online Merchants Should Accept It, STERLING
PAYMENT TECHS., https://www.sterlingpayment.com/news/industry-news/merchant-processingindustry/bitcoin-gains-popularity-why-more-online-merchants-should-accept-it/ (last visited Dec.
30, 2014) (“Credit cards are linked to personal identification information, which makes them
susceptible to fraud. Bitcoin is not linked with any personal information such as name or address
and thus offers a level of protection against identity theft and fraud.”).
159. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12.
160. Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).
161. See Know Your Customer: Quick Reference Guide, PWC (Jan. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/
en_GX/gx/financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-anti-money-laundering-know-your-customerquick-reference-guide.pdf (“Compliance with anti-money laundering, Know Your Customer
(‘KYC’) and sanctions regulatory regimes dominated the financial services landscape . . . . Firms
operating at a global basis will also need to demonstrate . . . that Anti Money Laundering (‘AML’)
regulatory requirements are being adhered to at both local and global level.”).
162. Ariel Deschapell, Why Know-Your-Customer Rules Won’t Work with Bitcoin,
COINDESK.COM (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.coindesk.com/know-customer-rules-wont-workbitcoin/.
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transactions. 163 Moreover, the increased anonymity makes it more
difficult for law enforcement to quickly and efficiently obtain
information on users that are found to be engaged in criminal activity. 164
3.

Susceptibility to Theft

Like cash, bitcoins can be lost or stolen. 165 However, Bitcoin poses
unique risks because the currency is stored electronically and the system
does not allow for reversals after a transfer or payment is made. Because
of these reasons, Bitcoin is attractive to cybercriminals and uniquely
susceptible to theft.
As an initial matter, online storage makes bitcoins susceptible to theft
by malicious actors that “can compromise personal computers and
accounts using malware and hacking techniques to steal users’
bitcoins.” 166 These concerns over lack of protection and suboptimal
security are not merely theoretical. As early as 2011, Bitcoin users had
reported hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of the virtual currency
as stolen. The amount of Bitcoin theft seems to have only grown since
that time. 167 As of March 2014, reports have estimated that a total of
818,485.77 bitcoins worth approximately $502,081,166.11 have been
stolen. 168 The problem of theft is not limited to the personal computers
of individual users being hacked. A number of Bitcoin based businesses
have also been targeted successfully. For example, Bitcoin thefts have
befallen Mt. Gox (the largest Bitcoin exchange) and Flexcoin (a Bitcoin
bank)—both of which failed in the aftermath of the alleged thefts.169
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The Troubling Holes in MtGox’s Account of How It Lost $600 Million in Bitcoins, MIT
TECH. REV. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/526161/the-troubling-holes-inmtgoxs-account-of-how-it-lost-600-million-in-bitcoins/; Takashi Mochizuki & Eleanor Warnock,
Mt. Gox Finds 200,000 Missing Bitcoins, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2014, at C2; Dylan Love, $500
Million Worth of Bitcoin Has Been Stolen Since 2010, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2014, 1:31 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-many-bitcoins-have-been-stolen-2014-3.
166. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12.
167. Adam Greenberg, Mt. Gox CEO Lied About Massive Bitcoin Theft According to Alleged
Hackers, SC MAG. (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.scmagazine.com/mt-gox-ceo-lied-about-massivebitcoin-theft-according-to-alleged-hackers/article/337613/; List of Bitcoin Heists, BITCOIN F.,
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=576337 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
168. Love, supra note 165.
169. Tom Hals, Failed Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox Gets U.S. Bankruptcy Protection, REUTERS
(June
17,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/17/us-bitcoin-mtgox-bankruptcyidUSKBN0ES2WZ20140617; Warner T. Huston, A Second Bitcoin Exchange Goes Bankrupt,
BREITBART.COM (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/03/04/A-SecondBitCoin-Exchange-Goes-Bankrupt; FlexCoin Is Shutting Down, FLEXCOIN.COM (Mar. 3, 2014)
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Once stolen, victims have few means of seeking redress. Bitcoin
transactions are viewed as final and irreversible. 170 As such, Bitcoin
payments are not subject to being challenged or charged back like credit
card transactions. 171 Instead, only the person receiving the bitcoins can
initiate a refund. 172 Moreover, because Bitcoins are not backed by the
government or any form of deposit insurance like money stored in
traditional bank accounts, victims are not protected from loss if a Bitcoin
exchange fails or is hacked. 173 Accordingly, victims are not protected
from loss if they store Bitcoins with an exchange and the exchange fails
or suffers a malicious attack or intrusion.
While theft of bitcoins receives the most publicity, the data mining
process can also be targeted. FBI “reporting indicates that malicious
actors can exploit the way bitcoins are generated by compromising
victim computers and instructing them to mine bitcoins.” 174 In short, the
irreversible nature of Bitcoin transactions and the wholly online storage
system appears to be particularly attractive to cyber thieves in the
absence of additional protections and/or security measures. As such, the
Bitcoin system provides different risks to users when compared to
traditional forms of payment. It follows that Bitcoin raises unique
regulatory challenges and considerations that are not necessarily present
when considering more traditional forms of payment.
B.

Efforts to Regulate

Bitcoin appears to promise additional benefits to users while also
raising new regulatory challenges. The innovative nature of Bitcoin,
however, does not fit neatly into existing models of regulation. Bitcoin

http://www.flexcoin.com/.
170. See Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015); Nicholas Weaver, Once You Use Bitcoin You Can’t Go ‘Back’—And
That’s Its Fatal Flaw, WIRED (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/once-you-usebitcoin-you-cant-go-back-and-that-irreversibility-is-its-fatal-flaw/. But see Eli Dourado, Stop Saying
Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t Reversible, ELIDOURADO.COM (Dec. 4, 2013), http://elidourado.com/
blog/bitcoin-arbitration/.
171. See Some Things You Need to Know, supra note 170; Weaver, supra note 170.
172. See Some Things You Need to Know, supra note 170; Weaver, supra note 170.
173. See Joe Miller, Bitcoin Vault Offering Insurance Is World’s First, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10,
2014, 11:06 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25680016; Joe Adler, Bitcoin Backers
BANKER
(Jan.
22,
2014,
12:14
PM),
Seek
FDIC-Style
Insurance,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_15/bitcoin-backers-seek-fdic-style-insurance-10650891.html; Anita Ramasastry, Should Mt. Gox Be Bailed Out?, JUSTIA.COM (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/03/11/mt-gox-bailed.
174. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 12.

10 - TuMeredith - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

RETHINKING VIRTUAL CURRENCY

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

301

has received increasing regulatory scrutiny with many jurisdictions
tackling the questions of whether to regulate virtual currencies, and if so,
how to implement an appropriate regulatory framework. To date, the
global regulatory response has been varied. Most jurisdictions have yet
to affirmatively enact virtual currency specific regulation. Some
jurisdictions seem amenable to the continued acceptance of virtual
currency while others appear averse to idea. The United States has made
great efforts to understand the functionality and risks of virtual currency.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the development of a regulatory
framework in the United States appears to be somewhat fragmented as
various bodies have provided limited guidance to clarify the treatment of
virtual currency under existing laws. Though this approach may be
lacking, the regulatory response thus far suggests that the United States
is willing to accommodate the continued use of virtual currency so long
as the risks associated with it can be mitigated to an appropriate degree.
1.

Foreign Response

In an effort to assess what measures might be appropriate for
implementation in the United States, the Law Library of the U.S.
Congress surveyed the regulation of Bitcoin in forty foreign
jurisdictions. 175 Despite variances in regulatory treatment, the survey
showed that country-specific responses generally fell into one of the
following broad categories: (1) no action to implement regulation of
virtual currency, (2) clarification of tax treatment of virtual currency
without further regulation, (3) prohibition or other limitations on the use
of virtual currency, and (4) recognition of virtual currency as a form of
currency that will be regulated as such.
Most countries fall into the first group—those that have not yet acted
to formally regulate virtual currency. This group includes Alderney,
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, 176 Chile, Croatia, Cyprus,
Denmark, 177 Estonia, the European Union, France, Greece, Hong Kong,

175. Anita Ramasastry, Bitcoin: If You Can’t Ban It, Should You Regulate It? The Merits of
Legalization, JUSTIA.COM (Feb. 25, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/02/25/bitcoin-cant-banregulate#sthash.4oUpDzhi.dpuf.
176. See, e.g., Braga, supra note 11.
177. It has been reported however, that Denmark is seeking to prepare standards that would
amend currently existing financial regulation to prevent money laundering through virtual
currencies. Frances Schwartzkopff & Peter Levrin, Bitcoins Spark Regulatory Crackdowns as
Denmark Drafts Rules, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1217/bitcoin-rules-drafted-in-denmark-as-regulator-warns-against-use.html; see also Braga, supra
note 11.
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India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Malta, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. 178 Given the relative newness of virtual
currency and the fact that it has only recently started gaining widespread
acceptance, it is not surprising that many jurisdictions have taken a waitand-see approach. Regulation often lags behind innovations in the
market and only time will tell how and whether these jurisdictions will
regulate virtual currencies.
The second group of countries can be categorized as having clarified
the manner in which virtual currencies such as Bitcoin will be taxed.
However, these countries have not yet addressed how and whether the
use of virtual currency will be regulated. For example, the United
Kingdom has stated that “bitcoin is currently unregulated.” 179 Though
unregulated, “Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [department] has
classed bitcoins as ‘single purpose vouchers’ . . . [subject] to a valueadded tax of 10–20%.” 180 Similarly, Norway, 181 Spain, and Finland will
assess bitcoins as capital property subject to a value-added tax of up to
twenty-five percent. 182 Adopting a somewhat different approach,
Slovenia and Israel assess profits derived from Bitcoin as taxable
income. 183 While the tax-treatment may vary, these jurisdictions appear
to have taken a first step towards clarifying the legal and regulatory
landscape for virtual currencies. However, the limited response fails to
affirmatively address many of the other regulatory considerations
impacting the growing use of virtual currency in the market. Instead,
these jurisdictions remain silent with respect to the regulation of virtual
currency, leaving the legal landscape applicable to virtual currencies
largely uncertain.
A third group of countries has opted to ban or severely limit the use of
virtual currencies. This group of countries includes Thailand, China, and

178. GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH DIRECTORATE STAFF, LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., REGULATION
BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
bitcoin-survey/regulation-of-bitcoin.pdf [hereinafter BITCOIN SURVEY]; Ramasastry, supra note
175.
179. BITCOIN SURVEY, supra note 178.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Braga, supra note 11.
182. Id. (“Finland, for example, is the latest country to deny Bitcoin categorization as a currency
or payment method, according to Paeivi Heikkinen, head of oversight at the Bank of Finland in
Helsinki. Mr. Heikkinen told Bloomberg the currency was, instead, more comparable to a
commodity.”).
183. BITCOIN SURVEY, supra note 178.
OF
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Iceland. 184 Thailand took the boldest step when the Bank of Thailand
ruled Bitcoin illegal. 185 Although Bitcoin is not illegal in China, “the
People’s Bank of China and four other ministries and agencies
announced that banks and payment companies were prohibited from
dealing with the coin.” 186 Because all banks and payment institutions in
China are prohibited from dealing in Bitcoin, the use of Bitcoin and
development of Bitcoin-based businesses is severely impaired. In short,
Chinese banks and payment companies are prohibited from exchanging
Chinese currency for bitcoin and otherwise participating in any Bitcoin
transactions. Iceland, although not banning the use of Bitcoin entirely,
has “stated that engaging in foreign exchange trading with bitcoins is
prohibited, based on the country’s Foreign Exchange Act.” 187 The
foregoing examples show that responses to Bitcoin are not limited to
attempts at designing a framework that embraces the continued use of
virtual currencies. Instead, some jurisdictions have opted to take a
position that appears averse, if not hostile, to the continued growth and
use of virtual currencies.
In contrast, the fourth group of countries can be categorized as
recognizing the validity of virtual currencies and seeking to either
develop new regulations or extend existing laws. In doing so, these
jurisdictions appear to be leveraging concepts from traditional financial
regulation and adapting them for use with virtual currencies. Three
countries have taken affirmative steps to recognize and regulate Bitcoin
as a valid currency or form of payment akin to traditional payment
methods. “On October 9, 2013, Brazil enacted Law No. 12,865, which
created the possibility for the normalization of mobile payment systems
and the creation of electronic currencies, including the bitcoin.” 188
Germany, similarly, views Bitcoin exchanges as financial service
companies that “must fulfil[l] strict standards of operation” including
meeting initial capital requirements, maintaining certain professional
qualifications, and reporting transactions to Germany’s financial
regulator, BaFin. 189 Sweden, although not creating a regulatory
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Kashmir Hill, Bitcoin in China: The Fall-out from Chinese Government Banning Real World
Use, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/06/bitcoinin-china-the-fall-out-from-chinese-government-banning-real-world-use/; see also Braga, supra note
11. This announcement also famously resulted in a precipitous drop in the value of Bitcoin
worldwide.
187. BITCOIN SURVEY, supra note 178.
188. Id.
189. Emily Spaven, Germany Officially Recognizes Bitcoin as ‘Private Currency’,
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framework unique to virtual currency, has found that Bitcoin constitutes
“a financial service, subject to a mandatory reporting requirement.” 190
By opting to take steps toward developing regulation applicable to
virtual currencies or clarifying the applicability of existing law, these
jurisdictions appear to be more willing to permit the continued growth of
virtual currencies so long as any associated risks can be mitigated.
As evidenced by the foregoing survey, the global regulatory response
has been varied. Foreign jurisdictions have dealt with the unique
characteristics and distinct risks of virtual currency in different ways. In
analyzing the various approaches, one thing is certain: Foreign
jurisdictions appear to be split when it comes to their willingness to
accept the possibility of virtual currency serving as an alternative
payment method. 191
2.

United States Response

While discussion regarding development of appropriate regulatory
frameworks necessarily lags behind innovations such as virtual currency,
the United States has been described as being “at the head of the pack”
with respect to its efforts at understanding, developing and implementing
a regulatory response.192 The foregoing notwithstanding, the current
legal environment in the United States evidences what appears to be
development and implementation absent a master plan. To date, the
United States has made great efforts to understand the unique
characteristics and potential risks of virtual currency. Nonetheless,
virtual currency hearings have not yielded any formal recommendations
or guidance. As a result, regulatory bodies, courts and state legislatures
have acted independently resulting in a regulatory mishmash of
guidance, clarification, extension and ongoing discussion.
In November 2013, the United States Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing entitled, “Beyond Silk
Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currency” to
assess whether “regulatory actions should be taken regarding
Bitcoins.” 193 After hearing testimony, the committee “seemed to be open
COINDESK.COM (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.coindesk.com/germany-official-recognises-bitcoin-asprivate-money/.
190. BITCOIN SURVEY, supra note 178.
191. Ramasastry, supra note 175.
192. Id.
193. Jason Mick, U.S. Government: Bitcoin Has . . . Confused the Heck Out of Many of Us,
DAILYTECH (Nov. 19, 2013, 7:30 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/US+Government+Bitcoin+
hasConfused+the+Heck+Out+of+Many+of+Us/article33780.htm.
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to the idea of bitcoins,” but it stopped short of making any formal
recommendations. 194 In the absence of formal recommendations and the
lack of any other overarching effort to develop a harmonized framework
for virtual currency, the regulatory environment facing virtual currency
remained unsettled.
At present, the United States has not taken any affirmative action to
ban virtual currency. Instead, the regulatory landscape in the United
States evidences a number of differing approaches to clarifying the
regulatory requirements applicable to virtual currencies with each of the
following contributing to the incremental development of a regulatory
framework: (1) uncertainty as to the scope of existing laws and their
application to virtual currencies in the absence of definitive guidance;
(2) the provision of definitive guidance from federal and state regulatory
bodies as well as courts regarding the treatment of virtual currency
within the context of existing laws, including the extension of such laws
to govern virtual currency; and (3) ongoing discussions and progress
towards the enactment of virtual currency specific regulation at the state
level. Ultimately, the U.S. regulatory response has provided increased
clarity, but may fall short of creating an effective legal and regulatory
framework for virtual currency.
a.

Uncertain Scope of Existing Law

In the absence of clear guidance, the presence of existing state and
federal laws may obviate the need for virtual currency specific
legislation. That is to say, the scope of existing law may be interpreted
broadly as applying to virtual currencies even if virtual currencies were
not contemplated at the time of adoption or do not fit neatly within the
statutory framework.
For example, “[m]odern theft statutes allow for prosecution for the
taking of intangible property.” 195 As such, virtual currency could be
construed as intangible property under the statute. However, the majority
of these statutes exist only at the state level and “[s]tate authorities often
do not have the resources to pursue crimes on the Internet
[or] . . . outside the United States.” 196 Accordingly, these state statutes

194. Id.
195. Peter J. Henning, For Bitcoin Square Peg Meets Round Hole Under the Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 9, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/for-bitcoin-square-peg-meetsround-hole-under-the-law/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=
blogs&_r=2&.
196. Id.
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may not be particularly effective to deter Bitcoin theft or provide a
meaningful remedy to victims. Federal authorities, although better
equipped to prosecute cyber-crime may not have the statutory authority
to do so. Commentators have noted that “[t]here is a federal law used to
prosecute the interstate transportation of stolen property, but it only
applies . . . to the theft of physical items and not intangible properties
like virtual currency.” 197 Other more applicable federal statutes do exist,
such as federal anti-wire fraud statutes or the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, which “makes it a crime to use a computer with the intent to
defraud in obtaining anything of value from the victim.” 198 This may
provide alternative mechanisms for federal authorities to prosecute
online theft. However, the applicability of these statutes to virtual
currency is unsettled because neither statute explicitly applies to Bitcoin
and no steps have been taken to clarify or amend the statutes. As such,
the question of “[w]hether stealing Bitcoins from an owner’s account
would constitute fraud [within the meaning of these statutes] is [still]
unclear.” 199
The foregoing examples highlight a common problem with regulating
innovative products and services. Regulation often lags behind, leaving
an uncertain legal environment. Existing laws often fail to contemplate
advances and may not be suitable for extension. Even if the language of
the existing statute could be construed as broadly inclusive of an
innovation such as virtual currency, the lack of clear guidance and/or
precedence as to the applicability of such statutes leaves the legal and
regulatory environment unsettled.
b.

Clarifying Existing Law

While the applicability of some laws has yet to be clarified,
governmental agencies at both the federal and state levels have started to
issue their own guidance as to the treatment of virtual currency under the
existing laws that fall under their purview.
In March 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced that “companies or
individuals that serve as sellers or exchangers for Bitcoin,” but not
Bitcoin investors or miners “may be regulated as money transmitters.” 200
In doing so, FinCEN unambiguously clarified the applicability of the
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ramasastry, supra note 175; FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27, at 3.
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existing federal anti-money laundering regulatory regime to virtual
currency. FinCEN’s regulation requires that money transmitters register
and report their transactions to the federal government. 201 “[F]ederal
law . . . do[es] not create large . . . burdens [such as] . . . large licensing
fees, minimum capital requirements or restrictions on how money held
by sellers or exchanges is invested,” 202 which are common under state
money transmitter laws aimed at consumer protection. 203 What may
create more severe regulatory burdens for Bitcoin firms, however, is the
potential for further and often unpredictable state-based regulation of
virtual currencies. In order to be in compliance with federal guidelines,
money transmitters also need to “obtain state money licenses” in order to
avoid “being prosecuted as unlicensed money transmitters.” 204
Accordingly, some commentators note that the FinCEN announcement
“may set off a race among states . . . to determine if and how their laws
apply.” 205
Few states have issued guidance or affirmatively amended their
statutes to explicitly account for virtual currency. In states that have yet
to address the applicability of their money transmitter laws to virtual
currency, the typically broad definition of regulated money transmission
could be construed as covering many virtual currency transactions.
Specifically, state money-transmitter laws commonly impose regulatory
compliance requirements on any person or entity that receives money or
monetary value for the purpose of transferring it to another person or
place. 206 Accordingly, a third-party that either (1) accepts bitcoin from
one person for the purpose of transferring the bitcoin to another location
or person or (2) accepts bitcoin or legal tender from one person for the
purpose of exchanging it and transferring it to another person or
location, could conceivably be construed as engaging in regulated
money transmission under state law. Because few states have issued
interpretive guidance or amended their statutes to clarify the question of
applicability to virtual currencies, it is ultimately unclear whether any

201. Ramasastry, supra note 175; FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27, at 3.
202. Ramasastry, supra note 175; see also Brett World, U.S. Treasury Cautions Bitcoin
Businesses on Compliance Duties, Advocate Cites ‘Chilling Effect’, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2014/01/06/u-s-treasury-cautions-bitcoinbusinesses-on-compliance-duties-advocate-cites-chilling-effect/.
203. Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 93 (2013).
204. Ramasastry, supra note 175; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012); Tu, supra note 203.
205. Ramasastry, supra note 175.
206. See, e.g., Transmitters of Money Act, 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 657 / 1–105 (2014); see also
Tu, supra note 203.
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particular virtual currency based business model is subject to state
money transmitter regulation.
Kansas and Texas, however, are two states that have issued general
guidance on the question. In both Kansas and Texas, the applicable state
regulator concluded that decentralized virtual currencies such as bitcoin
do not constitute money and do not have monetary value. 207 Because no
money or monetary value is involved, a person that is only engaged in
the exchange or transfer of a decentralized virtual currency from one
person to another person or location is not subject to the licensing and
other regulatory requirements under Kansas and Texas money
transmitter laws. 208 However, a third-party exchanger is likely to be
engaging in regulated money transmission because a typical exchange
transaction involves the receipt and transfer of legal tender by the thirdparty exchanger as an intermediary for the two parties to the
transaction. 209 The same is true of a Bitcoin ATM where the Bitcoin
ATM acts as a third-party intermediary for two other parties.210 In
contrast, Bitcoin ATMs that are structured as a transaction between two
parties, the customer, and the operator of the Bitcoin ATM, are unlikely
to be regulated under Kansas and Texas law because there is no
transmission (i.e., a promise to make the legal tender available at a later
time to another person or at another location). 211
Even with guidance from some states, the resulting regulatory
environment remains unsettled. Specifically, the lack of action in many
states means that regulators in different states could ultimately take
different positions on the applicability of state money transmitter laws to
virtual currencies. In the end, the current state of federal and state money
transmitter regulation in the context of virtual currencies highlights the
207. See KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM’R, MT 2014-01, REGULATORY TREATMENT
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE KANSAS MONEY TRANSMITTER ACT (2014), available at
http://www.osbckansas.org/mt/guidance/mt2014_01_virtual_currency.pdf
(“One
important
characteristic of cryptocurrency is its lack of intrinsic value. A unit of cryptocurrency does not
represent a claim on a commodity, and is not convertible by law. And unlike fiat currencies, there is
no governmental authority or central bank establishing its value through law or regulation. Its value
is only what a buyer is willing to pay for it.”); TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, SUPERVISORY
MEMORANDUM - 1037 (2014), available at http://www.dob.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/
consumer-information/sm1037.pdf (“Because neither centralized virtual currencies nor
cryptocurrencies are coin and paper money issued by the government of a country, they cannot be
considered currencies under the statute.”).
208. See KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM’R, supra note 207 (clarifying the applicability
of the Kansas Money Transmitter Act to virtual currencies such as Bitcoin).
209. Id.; see also TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, supra note 207.
210. Id.
211. Id.
OF
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potential for lack of harmonization when regulatory bodies act
independently in responding to innovations such as Bitcoin.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
attempted to define virtual currency for the purposes of regulation under
the existing provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. 212 The case stems from a Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) complaint charging a Texas man with
defrauding investors in a Ponzi scheme involving Bitcoin. 213 The SEC
charged Trendon T. Shavers, the founder and operator of Bitcoin
Savings and Trust (BTCST), with offering and selling Bitcoindenominated investments in violation of the anti-fraud and registration
provisions of Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Exchange Act
Rule 10b-5. 214 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that bitcoins are not money and therefore any investments
solicited and accepted by the defendants were not investments of money
under the federal securities laws. 215 In short, the defendants argued that
no money ever exchanged hands. 216 The SEC argued that the Bitcoin
investments at issue constituted “both investment contracts and notes,
and, thus, are securities” subject to regulation under existing federal
securities laws. 217 Ultimately, the court agreed with the SEC in
determining that “Bitcoin is a currency or form of money” and that the
investors “provided an investment of money.” 218 In denying the
defendant’s motion, the court reasoned that:
The term “security” is defined as “any note, stock, treasury
stock, security future, security-based swap, bond. . .[or]
investment contract. . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77b. An investment
contract is any contract, transaction, or scheme involving (1) an
investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the
expectation that profits will be derived from the efforts of the
promoter or a third-party. SEC v. W.J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298-99 (1946); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co, 881 F.2d 129, 132
(1989). First, the Court must determine whether the BTCST
investments constitute an investment of money. It is clear that
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013).
Id. at 8–9.
Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
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Bitcoin can be used as money. It can be used to purchase goods
or services, and as Shavers stated, used to pay for individual
living expenses. The only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is
limited to those places that accept it as currency. However, it
can also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the
U.S. dollar, Euro, Yen, and Yuan. Therefore, Bitcoin is a
currency or form of money, and investors wishing to invest in
BTCST provided an investment of money. 219
As evidenced by the court’s ruling, at least one federal court has
determined that Bitcoin constitutes currency or a form of money for the
purpose of federal securities laws and potentially subject to regulation as
such. In doing so, the court clarified how virtual currencies such as
Bitcoin fit within the existing federal securities law framework.
The IRS has also provided guidance applicable to the treatment of
virtual currencies under existing federal tax laws. 220 The IRS
acknowledged that virtual currencies lack the status of legal tender, but
can be held as an investment and/or used to purchase goods and
services. 221 Moreover, the IRS determined that certain virtual
currencies—those that have an equivalent value in real currency—are
treated as property. 222 Therefore, general rules applicable to property
transactions may apply to virtual currency transactions. 223 For example,
the gain or loss from the sale or exchange of virtual currency for other
property is taxable. 224 Likewise, wages paid to an employee in virtual
currency and virtual currency received in payment for goods or services

219. Id.
220. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-36, supra note 43; I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, at 6 (Mar. 25,
2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf [hereinafter IRS NOTICE 2014-21].
221. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-36, supra note 43; I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 220,
at 6.
222. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-36, supra note 43; I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 220,
at 6.
223. If virtual currencies are indeed considered property for the purposes of federal tax law, it
could negatively impact their value to corporations. Because corporations do not receive preferential
capital gains treatment, the gain recognized on the sale or exchange of Bitcoin in any transaction
would be taxed to most corporations at thirty-four percent or thirty-five percent. See JAMES S.
EUSTICE & BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 5.01, at 5-4 to 5-5 (1998). Moreover, corporations must recognize a gain on any
non-liquidating distribution of appreciated property. 26 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1988). As such, Bitcoin
distributions to shareholders are subject to both a corporate and shareholder level tax in addition to
the income the corporation recognizes on the sale or exchange of Bitcoin. See EUSTICE & BITTKER,
supra, at § 8.22, at 8-77 to 8-82. This may result in corporations choosing not to accept or capitalize
with Bitcoin.
224. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 220, at 3–4.
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is taxable as income. 225 Virtual currency, therefore, is property for
federal tax purposes.
As evidenced by the foregoing, the regulatory landscape affecting
virtual currency has become somewhat clearer with guidance
establishing the regulatory treatment of virtual currency under existing
laws. While the laws have not been amended to explicitly account for
virtual currencies, a greater level of certainty exists as to how regulators
and the courts are likely to view virtual currencies in the context of these
discrete statutory frameworks and existing statutory definitions. With
that said, these incremental responses are the result of independent
action that is narrowly focused on specific issues or regulatory
considerations impacting virtual currency in a particular context (i.e.,
anti-money laundering, securities, or tax). As a result, ongoing action
that independently clarifies the applicability of a particular law or
regulation to virtual currency could result in a lack of cohesion and
potentially even inconsistency as to the regulation of virtual currencies
across jurisdictions and regulatory bodies.
c.

Virtual Currency Specific Legislation

Some states have opted to consider amending existing statutes to
specifically account for virtual currencies or to enact new virtual
currency specific legislation as a means of accounting for virtual
currency’s unique characteristics and potential regulatory risks. In doing
so, these states would be attempting to develop a regime specifically
designed for virtual currency instead of either remaining silent as to the
applicability of existing laws or simply attempting to clarify how virtual
currency fits into existing regulatory frameworks.
For some time, it was presumed that California’s law regarding the
issuance of currency, section 107 of California’s Corporations Code,
would prohibit the use or acceptance of virtual currencies not issued by a
government entity. 226 However, in order to “accommodate the growing
use of alternative payment methods such as bitcoin,” Governor Jerry
Brown signed into law “AB-129 Lawful Money: Alternative Currency”
which repealed section 107. 227 In doing so, California clearly and
unambiguously sought to accommodate virtual currency and clarify that

225. Id. at 4–5.
226. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 107 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
227. Jeremy Kirk, California Removes Bank on Bitcoin, Dogecoin, and Other Alternative
Currencies, PCWORLD (June 30, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2449020/california-lawremoves-ban-on-alternative-currencies.html.
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the issuance and use of virtual currency is not banned under California
law, an act that is “likely to boost confidence around bitcoin” and other
virtual currencies. 228
Instead of modifying existing law, New York is actively developing
Bitcoin-specific regulation. In February 2014, the New York State
Department of Financial Services (DFS) held a hearing to assess whether
the state should “establish what has been called a ‘BitLicense’ . . . . [a
unique license for virtual currency that would] keep sellers on a
regulator’s radar screen, not only for purposes of law enforcement, but
also for consumer-protection purposes.” 229 Following the hearing, the
DFS issued an order announcing that it “will consider proposals and
applications in connection with the establishment of virtual currency
exchanges located in the State of New York.” 230 Approved virtual
currency exchanges will be required to comport with the virtual currency
regulatory framework to be proposed by DFS. 231 DFS has indicated its
intent to propose its regulatory framework, including a specifically
tailored BitLicense, no later than the end of the second quarter of
2014. 232 A press release from DFS also notes that DFS expects to start
considering proposals and applications for virtual currency firms other
than exchanges in the near future. 233 In creating a virtual currency
regulatory framework, DFS has stated that its goal is to: “balance
creating appropriate regulatory protections without stifling beneficial
innovation in the development of new payments platforms.” 234
In sum, the current United States regulatory environment for virtual
currency evidences a concerted effort by the government and regulatory
bodies to fully understand the functionality and implications of an
increasingly mainstream decentralized virtual currency such as bitcoin.
To date, the creation of a regulatory framework appears to be occurring
incrementally as guidance as to the applicability of existing laws to
virtual currency is provided and/or steps are taken to pass legislation
tailored specifically towards virtual currency. In the absence of such

228. Id.
229. Ramasastry, supra note 175.
230. See N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law §§ 2-b, 24, 32,
102-a, and 4001-b and Financial Services Law §§ 301(c) and 302(a) (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/po_vc_03112014.pdf.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. NYFDS Issues Public Order on Virtual Currency Exchanges, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN.
SERVS., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/po_vc_03112014.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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guidance or legislative action, uncertainty as to the scope and
applicability of existing laws remains. As a whole, however, the
regulatory response in the United States can be described as generally
open to the continued growth and use of virtual currency as a viable
payment alternative so long as appropriate regulations can be
implemented to address the risks associated with increasingly
mainstream virtual currency usage and business models.
Specifically, the United States has not yet provided any clear
indication that it would prohibit or ban virtual currency. Instead, the
United States’ response seems to be focused on trying to accommodate
virtual currency with California and New York, or perhaps Silicon
Valley and Wall Street, leading the discussion on the development of
virtual currency regulatory frameworks at the state level. Moreover,
other federal and state responses appear focused on extending existing
regulation to virtual currency where the potential risk from virtual
currency aligns with the goals of existing laws. While this process has
resulted in some additional clarity, the efforts appear to be occurring
independently with different agencies or courts focusing narrowly upon
a discrete set of regulatory concerns or the extension of a particular
regulatory framework. As a result, it is possible that continuing on this
path for developing virtual currency regulation may lead to a confusing
and complex, or even incoherent regulatory environment, resulting in
unforeseen problems requiring harmonization in the future.
IV.

REFOCUSING ON REGULATORY OBJECTIVES

We have shown that the potential advantages 235 of Bitcoin as a
payment method and investment vehicle have contributed to its
increasingly mainstream use. Bitcoin’s rise in popularity, however, has
also necessitated increased scrutiny as to its potential risks. The
anonymity afforded to Bitcoin users, for example, has led to a concern
that the currency will be used for criminal purposes.236 Similarly,

235. See, e.g., Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovated Alternative Digital Technology, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 168–76 (2012); Kier Thomas, Could the Wikileaks Scandal Lead
to New Virtual Currency?, PC WORLD (Dec. 10, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/
businesscenter/article/213230/could_the_wikileaks_scandal_lead_to_new_virtual_currency.html;
Doguet, supra note 37, at 1126.
236. See id.
236. See Ramasastry, supra note 175; Kim Zetter, FBI Fears Bitcoin’s Popularity with Criminals,
WIRED (May 9, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/05/fbi-fears-bitcoin/; Miranda Sumey, What’s
the Buzz About Bitcoin?, CYBERSECURITY POL’Y & RES. INST. (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.cspri.seas.gwu.edu/blog/2014/7/25/whats-the-buzz-about-bitcoin.
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because Bitcoin operates independently from any governmental
authority, many have expressed a concern that it lacks the safeguards
necessary to ensure consumer safety or the prevention of fraud. 237
As demonstrated by the global response to date, Bitcoin poses unique
challenges and little consensus exists on how to best regulate virtual
currency. In evaluating the U.S. response, we have concluded that
policymakers appear receptive to the continued growth and use of virtual
currency so long as its associated risks can be mitigated with appropriate
regulation. The foregoing notwithstanding, we questioned the United
States’ current process for developing a legal and regulatory framework.
Specifically, we suggested that: (1) current thinking about virtual
currency regulation is too narrowly focused on specific substantive
issues, 238 and (2) the developing regulatory environment may be flawed
as a result of independent agency action absent sufficient consideration
of how such action fits into other developing aspects of the virtual
currency regulatory regime as a whole. 239 As such, the current approach
may fail to facilitate a big-picture discussion of the spectrum of issues
raised by virtual currency and collaboration between the different
agencies with a role in regulating virtual currency.
To address this potential shortcoming, we propose that collectively
examining the regulatory objectives underlying existing law (as applied
to virtual currency) can be a valuable tool to advance the discussion and
development of a comprehensive and coherent system of virtual
currency regulation. While an analysis of all potentially applicable laws
is beyond the scope of this Article, we examine the following laws,
which have most commonly been suggested as having some bearing on
the regulation of virtual currency: (1) federal prohibitions on private
currency and the counterfeiting of government issued currency, 240 (2)

237. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1124.
238. Current efforts appear focused on clarifying whether the technical requirements of existing
laws apply to virtual currency. As such, the applicable regulatory body has been focused on
questions of statutory interpretation and clarifying the treatment of virtual currency under existing
laws within their purview. Accordingly, this narrow focus may not allow for sufficient consideration
of the many issues that are raised by virtual currency.
239. Because current efforts are characterized by clarification of existing law as applied to virtual
currency, action is being taken independently by each regulatory body that is charged with
enforcing a law that potentially impacts virtual currency. With such limited focus, there is little
room for cross-communication with other agencies to ensure consistency amongst the various
regulatory responses.
240. See, e.g., Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for A Byte
Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the e-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y, 165, 172–74 (2013).
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federal anti-money laundering legislation, 241 (3) state money-transmitter
laws, 242 (4) federal securities law and SEC regulations, and (5) federal
banking laws. 243 With respect to each, we examine whether the policy
goals that motivated the passage of those laws would be served in the
context of regulating decentralized virtual currency. We conclude that
regulation of virtual currency is justified based on these legitimate
regulatory objectives.
More importantly, this exercise provides new perspective that
facilitates consideration of virtual currency regulation holistically and
encourages interagency discussion. We argue that refocusing on
collective regulatory goals removes the constraints of current efforts to
regulate virtual currency. In doing so, regulators and policymakers will
be removed from the unavailing process of attempting to define virtual
currency in traditional terms (e.g. currency, investment, property,
commodity, or otherwise) and the restricted exercise of merely
determining the applicability of existing laws.
Instead, this approach engages policymakers and regulators to think
more broadly and creatively by: (1) looking at the regulatory goals that
are promulgated by the host of existing laws regardless of their ultimate
suitability for application to virtual currency, (2) making objective
determinations about the degree to which similar regulatory
considerations are implicated by virtual currency as distinct from
predefined constructs, and (3) considering how to best regulate virtual
currency (and its unique characteristics) to advance these goals.
Regardless of how virtual currency law develops (e.g. via overarching
legislation or a system of distinct federal and state laws), we suggest that
this approach will supplement existing efforts and contribute to the
development of comprehensive, cohesive, and appropriately scaled
regulatory framework.
A.

Federal Prohibitions on Private Currencies

One aspect of Bitcoin that is particularly troublesome to regulators is
its marked similarity, in some respects, to traditional currencies or
“money.” 244 As such, the legal frameworks impacting the issuance of
currency may be informative when evaluating the risks of virtual
currency and regulating to address such risks. Federal statutes as well as
241.
242.
243.
244.

See, e.g., id. at 178.
See, e.g., Kaplanov, supra note 122, at 156.
See, e.g., id. at 158.
Dion, supra note 240, at 172; BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 15.
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the United States Constitution reserve to the federal government an
exclusive right to issue currency. 245 The federal monopoly on the
issuance of currency is maintained by Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, which grants Congress the exclusive power to coin
money, 246 and the Stamp Payments Act of 1862, which restricts the
issuance of private currency. 247 Whether the creation of a bitcoin
constitutes the issuance of private currency under the Stamp Payments
Act, is unclear. Moreover, simply considering whether virtual currency
falls within the ambit of these laws is of little value to the development
of a virtual currency regulatory regime because virtual currency does not
fit neatly into the provisions of the either the Constitution or the Stamp
Payment Act. Nonetheless, given the similarities between the virtual and
traditional currency, the policy goals and objectives underlying the
restrictions on issuance of private currency remain instructive to the
continuing development of a comprehensive virtual currency regulatory
framework in the United States. Because “[t]he Constitution only
prohibits states [and not private companies or individuals] from coining
money,” 248 however, this analysis will focus on the provisions of the
Stamp Payments Acts as they are most immediately relevant.
1.

Stamp Payments Act Policy Goals

As a historical matter, the primary purpose of the Stamp Payments
Act was to prevent the hoarding and destruction of U.S. governmentissued currency. However, modern “[j]udicial interpretations of the
Act . . . indicate the [true] touchstone of the Act is [the prevention of]
competition with official currency.” 249 Therefore, as a practical matter,
the currently accepted purpose of the Stamp Payments Act is to restrict
the development of any form of money or currency (other than the
United States dollar) that is intended to circulate universally.
The Stamp Payments Act was enacted in response to currency
shortages during the nineteenth century. 250 At the time, “inflation [had]
caused the metal in . . . official [United States] coins to become more

245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
246. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that: “The Congress shall have
Power . . . To coin money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
Weights and Measures.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2012).
248. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 24.
249. Grinberg, supra note 235, at 183.
250. Id.
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valuable than . . . the coins themselves.” 251 As a result, official coins
were often hoarded or melted, which contributed to severe currency
shortages. 252 In order to continue doing business, companies began
issuing their own private currencies. 253 Fearing that these privatelyissued currencies might further contribute to inflation and threaten the
stability of the nation’s economy, a number of states prohibited “private
issue of notes and tokens in values less than $5.” 254 The federal
government, in turn, “adopted the substance of these state laws as
section 2 of the Stamp Payments Act” with the intent of preventing the
hoarding and destruction of official United States coins. 255 Section 2 of
the Act of 1862, which is still in effect today, provides:
Whoever makes, issues, circulates or pays out any note, check,
memorandum, token, or other obligation for less sum than $1,
intended to circulate as money or to be received or used in lieu
of lawful money of the United States, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 256
Although the Act’s prohibition may appear to be potentially broad in
scope, its applicability has been reined in by strict judicial
interpretation. 257 Moreover, modern interpretations of the Stamp
Payments Act highlight that the objectives served by the Act have
shifted. 258 No longer concerned with preventing the destruction of coins,
the Stamp Payments Act now exists primarily to restrict the growth of
any form of widely accepted currency or money that could compete with
the United States dollar.259
In United States v. Van Auken, 260 the Supreme Court concluded that
gift certificates are “payable . . . in goods, and in goods only,” and not
other currencies and therefore, do not run afoul of the Act’s prohibition

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2012).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366, 368 (1878); United States v.
Roussopulous, 95 F. 977, 978 (D. Minn. 1899); United States v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 26 F.
Cas. 1292, 1292–93 (W.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 15,796).
258. See, e.g., Van Auken, 96 U.S. at 368; Roussopulous, 95 F. at 978; Monongahela Bridge Co.,
26 F. Cas. at 1292–93.
259. See, e.g., Van Auken, 96 U.S. at 368; Roussopulous, 95 F. at 978; Monongahela Bridge Co.,
26 F. Cas. at 1292–93.
260. 96 U.S. at 368.
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on circulation of obligations for a sum. 261 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court noted that the term “sum,” as it is used in the Act, refers to a
“quantity of money or currency” and thus, applies only to things that can
be “measurable by the pecuniary standard” and not things measured, for
example, “by the pound, the gallon, [or] the yard.” 262 The court’s
reasoning accentuates that the purpose of the Act is not to restrict all
products or services that share some similarity to U.S. currency, but
rather to regulate the development of a true alternative currency to the
United States dollar. Here, the gift certificates did not fall within the
ambit of the Act because they were not denominated or measured by a
pecuniary standard.
Following Van Auken, the District Court for the District of Minnesota
in United States v. Roussopulous, 263 determined that “metal tokens that
were redeemable for 50 cents . . . at a particular store” 264 could not have
been “intended to circulate [universally] as money” within the meaning
of the Act because the tokens “do not purport to be a piece of money.” 265
Again, the court’s reasoning highlights that mere similarity with
currency of the United States is not enough. Here, the tokens were
measured by a pecuniary standard. 266 However, because of the limited
scope of use, the tokens did not have the potential for widespread
competition with the United States dollar.
Finding in a similarly restrictive manner, the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania concluded that a paper ticket which
can be exchanged for passage over a toll bridge does not constitute a
statutorily prohibited “private currency” because the tickets are not
comparable to United States coins or dollars “in shape, design or
material.” 267 Indeed, the Act has only been used to prohibit the issuance
of private currencies similar in appearance to the United States dollar
such that there is a danger of confusion with U.S. currency. 268 As such,
the court continued to evidence a view that the modern purpose of the
Stamp Payments Act is to prevent the rise of a universally accepted
private currency that could potentially compete with or be confused for
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 95 F. at 978.
264. Grinberg, supra note 235, at 185.
265. Id. at 977.
266. Id. at 978.
267. United States v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 26 F. Cas. 1292, 1292–93 (W.D. Pa. 1863) (No.
15,796).
268. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 24; see also Grinberg, supra note 235, at 193.
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United States currency.
In sum, the Act has not been interpreted to prohibit private currency
that “(1) circulates in a limited area, (2) is redeemable only in goods, (3)
does not resemble official U.S. currency and is otherwise unlikely to
compete with small-denominations of U.S. currency.” 269 Based upon an
application of these factors, federal courts have permitted a number of
“local currencies [to remain] in circulation . . . [including] the Cascadia
Hour Exchange in Portland [Oregon] and Life Dollars in Bellingham,
Washington.” 270 Nonetheless, the objectives underlying the Act would
ostensibly be served by applying its restrictions to any private currency
likely to compete with U.S. currency because it is: (1) circulated
universally, (2) measured in a pecuniary standard, and (3) similar in
appearance to official U.S. Currency.
2.

Application to Virtual Currency

In evaluating whether both the historical and modern purpose of the
Stamp Payments Act is served by regulating virtual currencies, it
appears that criminalizing the issuance and use of decentralized virtual
currencies on the basis of the statutory goals of the Act is not justified at
this time. Specifically, the historical concern over destruction of United
States coins is not implicated by virtual currencies such as bitcoin.
Moreover, virtual currencies have not yet and may never reach, a level
of widespread acceptance sufficient to compete with and threaten the
United States dollar.
Because no danger of currency shortage presently exists, the presence
of virtual currencies is unlikely to contribute to any hoarding or
destruction of U.S. coins. As such, the primary issue is whether Bitcoin
is a private currency that competes with the United States dollar to such
a degree that it ought to be prohibited. As applied to Bitcoin, a number
of the factors considered by the courts weigh against the legality of the
service. Bitcoins do not circulate in a limited area as they can be spent
anywhere a merchant is willing to accept them. 271 Indeed, as an
empirical matter, bitcoins have been spent across the world. 272 As such,
bitcoins are distinct from the tokens considered by the court in
Roussopulous, which could only be redeemed at a particular store. 273
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Grinberg, supra note 235, at 185.
BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 24.
See Doguet, supra note 37, at 1120; Krugman, supra note 38.
See, e.g., BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 15.
See United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F. 977, 978 (D. Minn. 1899).
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Even so, bitcoins cannot be said to circulate universally because the
virtual currency has not yet achieved that level of acceptance.
Nonetheless, Bitcoin likely has greater potential to challenge the United
States dollar than any private currencies that have been permitted to
date.
Bitcoins are also more likely to be viewed as potentially competitive
with the United States dollar in contravention of the underlying purpose
of the Act because bitcoins are measured by a pecuniary standard and
are not redeemable only in goods and services. Although bitcoins can be
exchanged for goods and services, bitcoins also possess an equivalent
value in United States dollars. Moreover, so long as they are accepted by
a money-changing service, they can be exchanged for U.S. or foreign
currency. 274 As such, bitcoins appear to pose a greater concern than the
gift cards considered by the court in Van Auken.
The foregoing notwithstanding, judicial concern over the danger of
confusion between a private currency and U.S. currency is unlikely to be
problematic because bitcoins are stored electronically and generally have
no physical manifestation. 275 With that said, bitcoin mints have started to
issue metal bitcoins that can be funded with Bitcoin value. 276 These
physical bitcoins are also unlikely to cause confusion because the coins
do not resemble U.S. currency and are clearly denominated in Bitcoin,
not United States dollars.
Despite little likelihood of confusion, the purpose of the factors
considered by the courts is to ensure that a private currency does not
function to compete with or undermine the value of government issued
money. 277 Whether Bitcoin could pose a serious challenge to the value of
United States dollar remains to be seen. One the one hand, bitcoin has
admittedly grown in popularity and is increasingly accepted as a valid
form of payment. As such, some supporters of the service hope that it
will emerge as a serious alternative to traditional currency, touting it as
the “destroyer of the dollar.” 278 The foregoing notwithstanding, there are
some built in limits on Bitcoin’s ability to fully displace governmentcontrolled currency. The total number of bitcoins is capped at twenty-

274. ROBERT STOKES, TECHNOLOGIES, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING REGULATION AND EMERGING PAYMENT TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2013).
275. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 24.
276. See Robert McMillan, Bitcoin Mint Reopens After Nastygram from Feds, WIRED (Jan. 15,
2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/casascius-back/.
277. Grinberg, supra note 235, at 183.
278. Jose Pagliery, Ron Paul: Bitcoin Could ‘Destroy the Dollar’, CNN MONEY (Dec. 4, 2013,
12:01 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/04/technology/bitcoin-libertarian/.
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one million, 279 which may present an insufficient challenge to the 1.23
trillion physical United States dollars presently in circulation.280 As
such, even assuming universal acceptance, Bitcoin may not be capable
of displacing or seriously competing with the United States dollar.
Even so, as the service gains popularity, the justification for
regulation or prohibition pursuant to federal laws prohibiting private
currency may strengthen. At present, the growth of bitcoin does not
appear to pose a credible threat to the United States dollar such that the
objectives of the Stamp Payments Act would be meaningfully served by
prohibiting the issuance and use of the virtual currency. In the future,
however, the continued growth of bitcoin may make a reassessment of
this regulatory concern necessary and appropriate. As some have
suggested, “if bitcoin ever really started to take off, governments would
either ban it or take over the system.” 281 Accordingly, the regulatory
goals of the Stamp Payment Act may impact the long-term approach that
policymakers take in developing virtual currency regulation in the
United States.
B.

Federal Anti-Money Laundering Legislation

Some legal scholars have suggested that despite the novel aspects of
virtual currency, it may already fall within the existing regulatory regime
for money transmitters. 282 As discussed above in Part III, regulations
governing money transmitters already exist at both the federal and state
level and, in fact, could be extended to apply to bitcoin exchanges. We
focus first on an analysis of federal money-transmitter laws enacted by
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to prevent money laundering. 283
At one point, the applicability of federal money transmitter laws was
unclear because it was unsettled whether virtual currency even
constituted “money” under the BSA.” 284 However, “FinCEN” has since
issued interpretive guidance and clarified that the BSA and its
implementing regulation apply only to real currency, or “the coin and
paper money of the United States or of any other country that . . . is
279. Doguet, supra note 37, at 1130.
280. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., HOW MUCH U.S. CURRENCY IS IN
CIRCULATION? (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12773.htm.
281. Edward Hadas, A Prediction: Bitcoin Is Doomed to Fail, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/a-prediction-bitcoin-is-doomed-to-fail/.
282. See, e.g., Doguet, supra note 37, at 1147.
283. Tu, supra note 203, at 86.
284. See generally Matthew K. Ly, Coining Bitcoin’s “Legal-Bits”: Examining the Regulatory
Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 587, 596–97 (2014).
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designated as legal tender and that . . . circulates and . . . is . . . accepted
as a medium of exchange.” 285 As such, transfers of bitcoin would be
excluded from regulation unless the transfer of “real currency” was also
involved. 286 FinCEN’s guidance has provided greater clarity about the
treatment of virtual currency under the BSA. However, there is still
much to learn from evaluating the regulatory goals of the BSA as it
provides insight into the degree of risk that virtual currency raises and
how best to mitigate such risk when regulating its unique features.
1.

Bank Secrecy Act Policy Goals

Arguably the most comprehensive set of regulations governing
traditional financial service providers in the United States is aimed at
preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorist or other
illegal activity. The center-piece of this regulatory scheme is the BSA. 287
Congress passed the Act with two goals in mind. First, Congress
“wanted to create a paper trail to inform law enforcement of potentially
suspicious activity. Second, Congress hoped to use the BSA as a weapon
to prosecute money launderers” based upon that paper trail. 288
Accordingly, the primary purpose underlying the BSA and its regulatory
requirements are to prevent illegal activity by requiring that regulated
entities assist with the identification and investigation of suspicious
transactions and customers.
Since its passage, the BSA’s requirements have been altered and
amended a number of times. Speaking broadly, the BSA generally
requires that financial institutions: (1) report suspicious transactions to
law enforcement, (2) maintain records of large and/or suspicious
transactions, (3) submit to compliance reviews of their anti-money
laundering efforts, and (4) develop methods of identifying potentially
dangerous customers.

285. Id. (quoting FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27).
286. FinCEN’s guidance noted that merely using virtual currencies to make purchases or
accepting virtual currencies as a method of payment “does not fit within the definition of ‘money
transmission services’ and therefore is not subject to [the BSA’s] . . . registration, reporting, and
recordkeeping regulations.” FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27. However, an individual that engages in
the business of exchanging virtual currency for traditional currency is a money transmitter subject to
the BSA. See id.
287. Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5330 (2012).
288. Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63
TENN. L. REV. 143, 153–54 (1995).
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Reporting Requirements

Affirmative reporting requirements form the first part of the BSA’s
efforts to identify and prevent illegal activity. The BSA originally
required that any covered “financial institution . . . [which in 1970
included only banks] file . . . [a] Currency Transaction Report (CTR)
[with the Department of Treasury], whenever an individual . . . [made]
transactions . . . involv[ing] . . . over $10,000.” 289 It was later widely
recognized, however, that “the BSA had [a] minimal impact on money
laundering throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s.” 290 Banks
“rarely complied with the CTR reporting requirements” and the
Department of Treasury “did not catch reporting irregularities.” 291
In response, Congress amended the BSA pursuant to the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which held
financial institutions criminally liable for “willful blindness” if the
financial institution became aware of facts indicating a high probability
of illegality but purposely fails to investigate on account of desire to stay
ignorant, there is knowledge of illegality. 292 As such, financial
institutions ran the risk of being held criminally liable if a client engaged
in criminal activity and the financial institution failed to investigate.293
b.

Recordkeeping and Customer Verification Requirements

To further advance the goals of identifying and preventing illegal
activity, the BSA also imposes recordkeeping requirements on regulated
financial institutions. In the early 1980s, Congress began an
investigation into a growing drug trade “which revealed the enormous
amount of money involved [and] . . . the widespread non-compliance of
banks with the reporting requirements of the BSA.” 294 In response,
Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which
amended the BSA by adding record-keeping requirements, mandating
that all financial institutions maintain records of all transfers of $10,000
or more into or out of the United States.295 Additionally, regulated
289. Id. at 152–53.
290. Id. at 154.
291. Id.
292. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 697 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976).
293. Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on Financial Institutions,
19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 437, 458 (1994).
294. Sultzer, supra note 288, at 158.
295. Id. at 152–53.
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financial institutions must verify the identity of purchasers of negotiable
instruments, such as cashier’s checks or traveler’s checks, in amounts
over $3000. 296 These requirements aided law enforcement officials by
ensuring that financial institutions maintain records for their review.
However, they also require financial institutions to make some
affirmative enforcement efforts themselves by verifying the identity of
certain customers.
c.

Registration Requirements and Compliance Checks

The BSA also requires licensing and registration of entities that
provide certain types of financial services. These requirements came
largely as a result of Ratzlaf v. United States. 297 In Ratzalf, the Supreme
Court overturned the convictions of defendants who had “‘deliberately’
structured a cash transaction of $100,000 . . . to pay a gambling debt to a
casino to avoid triggering the BSA’s reporting requirement.” 298 In
response, Congress passed the Money Laundering Suppression Act of
1994 (MLSA) to regulate certain non-bank financial institutions,
including casinos. 299 The MLSA, moreover, authorized the creation of a
set of Uniform Laws for states to regulate businesses engaged in
“provid[ing] check cashing, currency exchange, or money transmitting
or remitting services, or issu[ing] or redeem[ing] money orders,
travelers’ checks, and other similar instruments.” 300 These regulations
require non-bank financial institutions to submit to background checks,
register their businesses with the Secretary of State, and comply with the
BSA’s reporting requirements. 301 The purpose of these requirements is
to conscript non-bank financial institutions into assisting U.S.
government agencies with detecting and preventing money laundering
and permitting government examination of such institutions if they fail
to do so. 302

296. Id. at 178.
297. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
298. JAMES R. RICHARDS, TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS, CYBER CRIME, AND
MONEY LAUNDERING 143 (1998).
299. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES,
SECTION 8.1: BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL (2013), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf.
300. Money Laundering Suppression Act, 31 USC § 5330(d)(1)(A) (2012).
301. RICHARDS, supra note 298, at 143.
302. FinCEN’s Madate from Congress, FINCEN (last visited Jan. 30, 2015), www.fincen.gov/
statutes_regs/bsa.
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“Know Your Customer” Provisions

The most recent addition to the BSA’s anti-money laundering
regulatory framework was enacted in 2001 as Title III of the Patriot
Act. 303 Entitled the International Money Laundering Abatement and
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, the legislation introduced a
number of new regulatory requirements for financial institutions via
amendment to the BSA. 304 The requirements in Title III, however, were
not novel. In fact, they had been “under consideration for a number of
years prior to the September 11 attacks.” 305 The attacks did, however,
provide the political momentum for their implementation as well as
“elevated the rigor with which existing BSA requirements were
applied.” 306
The most pertinent Title III amendment added “know your customer”
(KYC) provisions. 307 The cornerstone of the KYC provisions is the
Customer Identification Program (CIP). 308 In short, every bank or
financial institution is required to implement a written CIP appropriate
for its size and type of business. The CIP must:
enable the bank to form a reasonable belief that it knows the true
identity of each customer . . . . based on the bank’s assessment
of the relevant risks, including those presented by the various
types of accounts maintained by the bank, the various methods
of opening accounts provided by the bank, the various types of
identifying information available, and the bank’s size, location,
and customer base. 309
In addition to the CIP, banks are “required to subject each customer to
a customer due diligence process (CDD) that may involve collection
of . . . more information than was gathered for purposes of . . . CIP.” 310
“Each bank is required to comply with its own established CDD policies
303. International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 301–377, 115 Stat. 296.
304. Id. at §§ 351–370.
305. Mark E. Plotkin & B.J. Sanford, Patriot Act–The Customer’s View of “Know Your
Customer”–Section 326 of the USA Patriot Act, 1 BLOOMBERG CORP. L. J. 670, 671 (2006).
306. Id.
307. See id. at 672; 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (Dec. 7, 1998) (OTS); id. at 67,529 (FDIC); id. at 67,524
(OCC); id. at 67,516 (FRB); 64 Fed. Reg. 15,310 (Mar. 31, 1999) (FRB); 64 Fed. Reg. 15,137 (Mar.
30, 1999) (OCC); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (Mar. 29, 1999) (FDIC); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (Mar. 29,
1999) (OTS).
308. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 305, at 674.
309. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121(b)(2) (2010).
310. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 305, at 677.
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and procedures, or risk possibly severe regulatory penalties.” 311
Based upon this information and ongoing monitoring of their
customers’ accounts, financial institutions are expected to file a
suspicious activity report whenever it “knows, suspects, or has reason to
suspect” illegal activity is or is likely to be occurring. 312 In short, the
know your customer requirements impose a much greater regulatory
burden on regulated financial institutions by involving them in the
process of identifying potentially illegal activity via gathering of
customer information and monitoring customer transactions. In doing so,
regulated financial institutions are charged with actively identifying and
reporting potentially illegal transactions, which ultimately promotes the
policy goals of helping with the identification and prevention of criminal
activity.
2.

Application to Virtual Currency

The purpose of the BSA, to prevent misuse of the financial system to
engage in money laundering, terrorist financing, or other criminal
activity, also appears to justify regulation of decentralized virtual
currency. The same concerns that motivated the passage of the BSA—
that legitimate financial services might be abused to facilitate or
“whitewash” illegal activity—exist in the context of virtual currency. In
fact, the potential for Bitcoin to facilitate criminal activity is the primary
justification provided by those calling for regulation of the Bitcoin
service. 313 Many have explained that the unique characteristics and
functionality that has allowed Bitcoin to grow in popularity also make it
attractive to criminals. According to one commentator “[d]igital
currencies are attractive vehicles for money laundering [and terrorist
financing] because they allow fast, anonymous, through-the-Internet
transfers.” 314 Like many traditional financial services, decentralized
virtual currencies, though largely used for legitimate purposes, are
susceptible to being used to facilitate criminal activity. Therefore, the
legitimate regulatory purpose of the BSA is implicated by virtual
currencies and would appear to justify regulation of virtual currency so
as to mitigate the risk of its misuse, or to capitalize on its ability to assist
with the identification and investigation of criminal activity. The
311. Id. at 679.
312. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18(a)(2) (2010).
313. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 223, at 204; STOKES, supra note 274; Dion, supra note 240,
at 179–80.
314. Grinberg, supra note 235, at 204.

10 - TuMeredith - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

RETHINKING VIRTUAL CURRENCY

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

327

foregoing notwithstanding, the mere extension of the BSA’s existing
regulatory requirements may not be appropriate when applied to virtual
currencies.
As an initial matter, the potential for misuse of the Bitcoin service for
criminal purposes does not justify the outright prohibition or banning of
it. As noted above, the possibility of using a legitimate financial service
for a criminal purpose is not something new or unique. As with
traditional financial services, a distinction must be made between the
Bitcoin service and its potential for misuse. While the risk of misuse
exists, early calls to “crack down” on Bitcoin focus too much on highly
publicized cases of Bitcoin being used in connection with criminal
activity. It has been noted, for example, that “Bitcoin’s association with
Silk Road has tarnished its reputation.” 315 “Silk Road” is an online
marketplace where a number of illicit goods, including illegal weapons
and drugs, may be purchased anonymously. 316 It does not “accept credit
cards, PayPal, or any other form of payment that can be traced or
blocked. The only money [accepted on the site] . . . is Bitcoins.” 317
Though Bitcoin exists entirely independent of Silk Road, it was Silk
Road’s acceptance of Bitcoin for illegal drug sales that inspired Senators
Charles Schumer and Joe Manchin to send a letter to Attorney General
Eric Holder and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s administrator
Michele Leonhart calling for a crackdown. 318
By seeking to regulate bitcoins, however, the Senators have failed to
effectively distinguish between the risk posed by the Silk Road site and
the Bitcoin technology itself. Specifically, the development of an
appropriate regulatory regime for virtual currencies should not focus on
isolated incidents of misuse. Instead, the use of virtual currencies should
be viewed holistically to identify legitimate risks and to develop
appropriate regulatory requirements to mitigate those risks.
In evaluating Bitcoin, it appears that its susceptibility for misuse is
not categorically different than many traditional money services
regulated under the BSA. Although as the currency becomes more
reliable, illegal use may increase, one study estimated the total monthly
Silk Road transactions amount to be approximately $1.2 million, which
315. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 20.
316. Adrean Chen, The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable,
GAWKER (June 1, 2011), http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buyany-drug.
317. Id.
318. Brett Wolf, Senators Seek Crackdown on ‘Bitcoin’ Currency, REUTERS (June 8, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/us-financial-bitcoins-idUSTRE7573T320110608.
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is a small percentage of the total value of monthly bitcoin
transactions. 319 Despite the relatively small number of bitcoins that are
spent funding illegal activity, the largely unregulated environment, along
with the greater level of anonymity provided, make Bitcoin more
susceptible to misuse when compared to traditional money services that
are now regulated under the BSA. Accordingly, Bitcoin is similar to
traditional financial services in that there are legitimate uses for the
service along with the potential for use in connection with criminal
activity. While the potential for misuse does not appear to justify the
outright prohibition of bitcoin, it certainly appears to justify some
manner of regulation. Moreover, Bitcoin like traditional money service
providers, may be in a unique position to assist with the identification or
investigation of clients that engage in suspicious financial activity.
Although the risks that motivated the BSA’s regulation of traditional
financial services are also presented by Bitcoin, the mere extension of
the BSA’s regulatory requirements do not necessarily fit in the context
of virtual currencies. As such, the development of an appropriate
regulatory framework for virtual currencies should consider and seek to
mitigate the potential preventing criminal activity. However, the method
of regulation must be modified or wholly re-conceived of so as to take
into account for the unique characteristics of virtual currency.
For example, the BSA’s “Know Your Customer” provisions and
“Customer Due Diligence” requirement were intended to apply where
clients could appear in person to present identification or at least had
personal information associated with their accounts. These requirements
may be difficult to implement in the world of Bitcoin because of the
anonymity granted to users of the service. Indeed, the basic functionality
of the Bitcoin service serves as an impediment to implementing KYC
provisions that require investigation and information gathering about
customers. The Bitcoin network itself cannot be charged with
implementing such requirements. Moreover, the lack of customer
identifying information being transmitted with transactions makes it
difficult for intermediaries engaging in Bitcoin transactions (e.g.
exchangers) to implement and comply with KYC or CDD requirements.
The mere extension of other BSA-style requirements to virtual
currency leads to a similar result. The BSA’s licensing and registration,
for example, presents an immediate dilemma. To what entity would such
a requirement be directed? As a peer-to-peer network, the Bitcoin
service itself lacks a centralized entity that could be required to register.

319. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 20.
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Bitcoin miners, merchants, and users all operate anonymously and,
therefore, without substantial modification, are not susceptible to
licensing. Accordingly, intermediary services such as Bitcoin exchanges
are the most obvious (and perhaps only) target.
The BSA’s reporting requirements—that especially large or otherwise
suspicious transactions be reported to the Department of the Treasury—
might be more easily implemented in the Bitcoin context. However,
challenges still remain. Because all Bitcoin transactions are viewable by
all members of bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network, a government regulatory
agency might simply monitor these transactions for suspicious activity
independently. The difficulty, however, presents itself upon a
consideration of how it might be enforced should suspicious activity be
discovered. Any suspicious transfer that was discovered could only be
linked to a “public key” encryption code, not a particular person.
However, as noted by a member of Bitcoin’s core development team,
given the unique information resources of law enforcement and
“sophisticated network analysis techniques” it may be possible to “parse
the transaction flow and track down individual Bitcoin users.” 320 At a
minimum, the unique characteristics and functionality of the bitcoin
service appear to make it more difficult to implement monitoring and
reporting requirements as a component part of identifying and
preventing criminal activity utilizing Bitcoin transactions.
Because of the difficulties inherent in implementing BSA-style
regulations that impose compliance requirements on the Bitcoin service
itself, regulators may be better served by seeking instead to regulate the
intermediaries that facilitate Bitcoin transactions such as exchangers. 321
These money changing businesses might operate as a regulatory “choke
point” and could also be required to submit to the same regulatory
requirements imposed on other financial service providers by the BSA
(e.g., know your customer requirements, customer investigation,
transaction
monitoring,
suspicious
activity
reporting
and
licensing/registration). 322 Another example of a proposal for regulating
around the inherent difficulties of the Bitcoin service is the possibility of
freezing or seizing bank accounts that have received currency in
exchange for bitcoins. 323
While the regulation of Bitcoin businesses serving as intermediaries

320.
321.
322.
323.

Chen, supra note 316.
STOKES, supra note 274, at 4.
Id.
Wolf, supra note 318.
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facilitating Bitcoin transactions is likely to continue, such a regulatory
response standing alone is imperfect. As an initial matter, the current
efforts to regulate exchangers under federal money transmitter laws
forgoes the possibility of identifying criminal uses involving Bitcoin
where the transaction only involves bitcoins (i.e. in which no exchange
for traditional currencies is made). Where a third-party exchange is not
involved, the regulatory requirements will not be triggered. 324 As such,
the ability of regulatory and enforcement agencies to identify criminal
activity will be hampered.
Moreover, Bitcoin intermediaries (such as exchanges) faced with
heightened regulatory standards may simply choose to stop providing
traditional currency in exchange for bitcoins altogether, which would
stifle the growth and long term viability of virtual currencies as a
payment alternative. Accordingly, a regulatory regime that focuses
solely on the imposition of compliance requirements on intermediary
services may have the practical effect of an outright ban on virtual
currency. If the United States seeks to develop a regulatory framework
that accommodates virtual currency while mitigating any associated
risks, it appears that rethinking the traditional methods of regulating to
identify and prevent criminal activity will be necessary. If, however, the
potential risk of criminal use of virtual currencies is too great and no
viable alternative regulatory strategies exist to mitigate such concerns,
then the United States may need to reevaluate the fundamental question
of whether virtual currencies should be banned.
In sum, the clearly legitimate policy goal embodied in the Bank
Secrecy Act—the prevention of criminal activity—presents a
conundrum for regulating the Bitcoin. It is beyond genuine dispute that
there is at least some risk of bitcoins being used to facilitate illegal
activity, and that identification of suspicious Bitcoin transactions might
assist with the identification and prevention of criminal activity.
However, the regulatory requirements included in the BSA that are
effective at curtailing money laundering and terrorist financing with
respect to traditional financial services appear to be either inadequate or
inappropriate for virtual currency. Therefore, in developing a
comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for virtual currencies,
policymakers should recognize that the regulatory concerns prompting
enactment of the BSA are present in the virtual currency context. While
the BSA may be instructive in that regard, policymakers will need to
rethink and reconceive the regulatory framework for identifying criminal

324. See FIN-2013-G001, supra note 27.
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activity involving the use of virtual currencies.
C.

State Financial Consumer Protection Law

Where the BSA (including its money transmitter provisions) seeks to
prevent money laundering, state money transmitter laws have a different
regulatory objective—consumer protection. 325 As discussed above, two
states have attempted to clarify the scope of these requirements as
applied to virtual currency. 326 In doing so, these states have primarily
focused on answering the question of whether virtual currency
constitutes money or value under the statute. While such guidance helps
to clarify whether and in what situations state money transmitter laws
apply to virtual currency, it provides little insight into bigger picture
discussion as to the objectives and compliance requirements that would
form an effective regulatory framework for virtual currency. As such,
the following section evaluates the degree to which the regulatory
objectives advanced by state money laws are also implicated in the
context of virtual currency, and shows how this analysis is useful to
thinking holistically about the development of a cohesive,
comprehensive, and appropriately-scaled virtual currency framework.
1.

Policy Goals of State Money Transmitter Laws

The primary purpose of state money transmitter laws is to protect
consumers from suffering financial loss as a result of dealing with a
money transmitter. To that end, the regulatory requirements imposed by
state money-transmitter laws function as “‘safety and soundness’ laws
aimed at protecting consumers from suffering losses” as a result of the
nonperformance or failure of a regulated money transmitter.327
Regulated money transmitters generally include any business that
transmits funds from one person to another. 328 Although the
requirements vary from state to state, money transmitters typically are
required to obtain a license from the appropriate state regulatory body
and:
(1) furnish a surety bond or similar security device; (2) satisfy
325. Tu, supra note 203, at 82.
326. See supra note 207.
327. Tu, supra note 203, at 82.
328. Hearing on the Regulation of Non-bank Money Transmitter—Money Services Businesses:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Congress (2012) (testimony of Ezra C. Levine), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba15-wstate -elevine-20120621.pdf.
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minimum net worth requirements; (3) maintain minimum levels
of specified types of permissible investments (e.g., government
obligations and other low-risk investments); (4) retain specified
business records for statutorily mandated periods of time; and
(5) file annual and periodic reports relating to financial
condition and upon the occurrence of significant events. 329
The majority of these requirements were passed in the early 1980s to
address a unique historical and financial problem. A number of large
money-order companies publicly defaulted and, because money
transmitters generally are not FDIC-insured, “consumers [were] . . . left
holding the bag [when] . . . money transmitter[s] d[id] . . . not forward
the funds to the intended recipient.” 330 The above-noted bonding and
licensing requirements were intended to minimize the risk posed to
consumers, should they choose rely on a third-party to efficiently deliver
funds. 331 Accordingly, the purpose of state money transmitter laws is to
protect consumers by imposing regulatory requirements designed to
mitigate the risk of financial loss due to the nonperformance or failure of
a third-party who contracts with the consumer to take and deliver money
on behalf of the consumer.
2.

Application to Virtual Currency

The consumer protection purpose underlying the need for state money
transmitter laws is also implicated in the context of virtual currency.
Regardless of whether the existing language of state money transmitter
laws can or should be interpreted to cover virtual currency, the use of
virtual currency leaves consumers open to the potential for financial loss
with few meaningful outlets for redress.
As a technical matter, Bitcoin is not a legal entity. As a global peerto-peer network, Bitcoin itself is unlikely to be capable of regulation as a
money transmitter. 332 Turning to the intermediaries that provide Bitcoinbased services, it can be argued that certain third-party services carry the
same risk of consumer loss that justifies regulation of traditional money
transmitters. For example, a consumer may utilize a third-party bitcoin
wallet to transfer bitcoins to another bitcoin user. In the event that the
third-party does not deliver the bitcoin or payment as expected, the
consumer may suffer a loss. Similarly, consumers who purchase goods
329.
330.
331.
332.

Tu, supra note 203, at 93 (internal citations omitted).
BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 29.
Id.
Id.
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and services from a merchant accepting Bitcoin often deliver bitcoins to
a third-party processor or exchanger engaged by the merchant. The
third-party is then charged with delivering the bitcoin to the merchant or
exchanging the bitcoin for traditional currency before delivering it to the
merchant. Again, the consumer may bear some risk if the third-party
does not deliver the payment because a merchant may be unwilling to
deliver promised goods or services if payment is not received.
In fact, Bitcoin may present an even stronger consumer protection
justification for regulation. Consumer protection remains a concern even
in situations where the third-party intermediary delivers the Bitcoin
payment as promised or the consumer pays the bitcoin directly to the
merchant. This is because Bitcoin as a payment method lacks the dispute
resolution procedures and related protections that are available for credit
card payments. Payments made via credit cards, for example, can be
reversed if a cardholder claims that they are fraudulent or erroneous. 333
These reversals, known as “charge-backs,” protect consumers from
“unscrupulous merchants or merchant errors.” 334 Bitcoin, in contrast, is a
“nonreversible payment system” that might leave consumers vulnerable
to fraud. 335 Should a consumer find, for example, that an online
merchant has failed to deliver an item purchased with bitcoin, they may
be left without an efficient remedy because “Bitcoin transactions cannot
be reversed if the receiving party doesn’t agree to the refund.” 336
Bitcoin also raises additional consumer protection concerns outside of
the potential for loss in connection with a payment or transfer. Because
Bitcoin is stored electronically and transfers are irreversible, a similar
risk exists with respect to Bitcoin Banks or Bitcoin Wallets that provide
online storage to Bitcoin users. 337 If bitcoins are stolen because the
security of the Bitcoin Bank or Bitcoin Wallet is compromised, there
may be few meaningful avenues of redress for the victim. Moreover,
little regulation exists to ensure that the providers of such services have
implemented minimum security standards or are otherwise qualified to
operate. As such, a legitimate consumer protection concern is raised by
Bitcoin that extends beyond the money transmitter context.

333. Gilbert J. Schroeder & Robert J. Moody, Credit Card Fraud Losses: A Case Study on Credit
Card Chargebacks, 3 FIDELITY L. ASS’N J. 23, 27 (1997).
334. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 45, at 12.
335. Id.
336. Jim Edwards, 18-Year-Old Reports $1 Million Bitcoin Theft from ‘Bank’ He Controlled—
And Says He Can’t Call the Cops, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/1million-bitcoin-theft-in-australia-2013-11#ixzz2nE2SYctF.
337. Id.
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In Bitcoin’s short life “[t]here have been several high-profile thefts of
bitcoins . . . including a hacker attack . . . on a Czech exchange called
Bitcash.cz that emptied four thousand digital wallets belonging to
customers.” 338 In addition, a Bitcoin wallet service, called Inputs.io, had
more than 4000 bitcoins (valued at $1.3 million) stolen. Touted as “one
of the most secure web wallets on the market,” Inputs.io was operated by
an 18 year old. 339 The response of these services accentuates the limited
recourse that the victims have to recover any losses. Bitcash.cz simply
announced that it had filed suit seeking to recover against the alleged
hackers. 340 Presumably, the victims will not recover the value of their
lost bitcoins unless the lawsuit is successful. In contrast, Inputs.io’s
administrator has committed his personal funds to reimburse users “up to
100 percent depending [up]on the amount” lost. 341 As such, the victims
will receive a percentage of the value of their stolen bitcoins but only as
a result of the service provider’s apparent generosity.
Mt. Gox, the world’s largest Bitcoin exchange, proved that this risk to
consumers is present even when utilizing the most well-established
services. In February 2014, Mt. Gox announced that it had become
insolvent. 342 Documents and e-mails recovered from the firm indicated
that the exchange’s 744,408 bitcoins, which account for approximately
six percent of all bitcoins in existence, had “slowly been stolen over the
course of several years.” 343Approximately 200,000 bitcoins have been
recovered in the case of Mt. Gox, but this still brings “the [number of]
lost Bitcoins [to] around 650,000,” a painful number for the users of the
Mt. Gox service. 344 With Mt. Gox insolvent and bitcoins stolen, the
victims have few avenues for seeking redress for their losses.
Although the consumer protection concern appears to be legitimate,
proponents of Bitcoin note that the risks are minimal because many
companies ultimately choose to refund their customers should theft
338. Brian P. Eha, Why Regulate Bitcoin, NEW YORKER (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/11/why-regulate-bitcoin.html.
339. Jim Urquhart, Bit-heist: Over $1mn in Bitcoins Stolen from Australian Online Bank,
REUTERS, rt.com/news/bitcoin-hacking-stolen-million-417/ (Nov. 10, 2013).
340. Jack Moore, Czech Bitcoin Exchange Hacked with 4,000 Wallets Emptied, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2013), m.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-czech-exchange-wallet-hacked-521981.
341. Urquhart, supra note 339.
342. Rob Wile, Bitcoin Exchange MtGox Disappears, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/reports-mtgox-halts-all-trading-2014-2.
343. Id.
344. James Lyne, $116 Million Bitcoins ‘Found’ at MtGox and How to Protect Your Wallet,
FORBES (Mar. 21, 2013), www.forbes.com/sites/jameslyne/2014/03/21/116-million-bitcoins-foundat-mtgox-and-how-to-protect-your-wallet/.
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occur. 345 Further, they argue that the value of stolen bitcoins is
somewhat limited, because transactions of bitcoins are made public, it
would be difficult for a “bitcoin bank-robber” to use ill-gotten gains
without being immediately detected. 346
The foregoing notwithstanding, the consumer protection concerns
underlying state money transmitter laws would appear to justify some
degree of Bitcoin regulation. 347 Consumers face the potential for
financial losses when dealing with third-parties in transfer or payment
transactions that are similar to traditional money transfer services
regulated under state law. However, the risk of consumer harm does not
end there. Consumer protection concerns extend beyond the scope of
those targeted by money transmitter laws because of the lack of
regulation surrounding other Bitcoin services and the potential for theft
without redress. Given the absence of regulatory or other protections,
consumers may only be protected by the benevolence of merchants and
service providers. Thus, many of the same risks that existed with respect
to traditional currencies prior to regulation of money transmitters are
also present with Bitcoin.
In fact, the consumer protection concerns associated with Bitcoin
appear more far-reaching than those that prompted the regulation of
money transmitters. As such, the technical application or extension of
state money-transmitter laws to Bitcoin is not only ill-suited but also
likely insufficient to address the unique risks of decentralized virtual
currency. Accordingly, consideration of the unique consumer protection
risks of Bitcoin aids in the development of a regulatory response that can
mitigate the unique risks of virtual currency.
D.

Federal Securities Regulation

Because Bitcoin can be viewed as a speculative investment, some
have suggested that it might effectively be regulated by extending the
application of federal securities law. 348 At least one federal court has
explicitly held that certain Bitcoin investments “meet the definition of
investment” subject to regulation pursuant to Sections 20 and 22 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 21 and 27 of the Exchange Act of

345.
346.
347.
348.

Eha, supra note 338.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Dion, supra note 240, at 194.
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1934. 349 In doing so, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas provided greater clarity as to the treatment of virtual
currencies under federal securities laws by answering the narrow
question of whether Bitcoin falls within the existing statutory definition
of the term “investment.” The decision ostensibly extends the technical
requirements governing securities to virtual currency. However, the
mechanical extension of requirements designed for traditional securities,
such as stocks and bonds, may be difficult to implement for virtual
currency.
While the extension of these laws to virtual currency may be
inapposite, evaluating the regulatory objectives of securities laws is
useful to inform the development of a tailored virtual currency
framework.
1.

Policy Goals of Federal Securities Law

Prior to 1933, there was very little regulation of securities in the
United States. 350 Instead, investors were loosely regulated solely at the
state level in a manner which resulted in a “Wild West
[style] . . . market.” 351 Due to this patchwork style of regulation,
“securities were misunderstood by most investors, who fell prey to
fraudsters manipulating the market, as well as companies who operated
with unique accounting schemes and often would not disclose negative
facts.” 352 Despite these well-recognized abuses, Congress was not
compelled to step in until these largely unregulated and volatile
investments contributed, in part, to the Wall Street Crash of 1929. 353
Following the crash, Congress convened what became known as the
Pecora Commission to investigate the roots of the market’s failure. 354
The Commission’s finding resulted in the passage of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 355 These statutes serve

349. See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18,
2014).
350. See Glyn A. Holton, United States Financial Regulation, RISK GLOSSARY (2004),
http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/united_states_financial_regulation.htm (“Prior to 1933, US
securities markets were largely self-regulated.”).
351. See, e.g., Dion, supra note 240, at 192.
352. Id. at 193.
353. Sargon Daniel, Hedge Fund Registration: Yesterday’s Regulatory Schemes for Today’s
Investment Vehicles, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 247, 277 (2007).
354. J. Scott Colesanti, Demanding Substance or Form? The SEC’s Plain English Handbook as a
Basis for Securities Violations, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 95, 103–04 (2012).
355. Daniel, supra note 353, at 277.
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similar but distinct purposes.
Often referred to as the “truth in securities” law, the Securities Act of
1933 has two basic objectives: (1) to “require that investors receive
financial and other significant information concerning securities being
offered for public sale,” 356 and (2) “prohibit deceit, misrepresentations,
and other fraud in the sale of securities.” 357 In order to achieve these
goals, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “created the Securities and
Exchange Commission” which was given “broad authority . . . . to
regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing
agencies as well as the nation’s securities self-regulatory
organizations.” 358
These acts, in concert, require that any security that is issued also be
registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). This
registration regime “enables investors, not the government, to make
informed judgments about whether to purchase a . . . securit[y].” 359 If the
information contained in the registration documents filed with the SEC
is inaccurate and an investor suffers a loss as a result of their reliance
upon that information, the Act imposes civil, and sometimes criminal,
penalties upon the party that has engaged in improper registration. 360 As
such, the objective underlying federal securities law is ensuring
disclosure of material information such that investors are not misled and
can make informed investment decisions.
2.

Application to Virtual Currency

In the absence of regulation, Bitcoin raises similar concerns regarding
the potential for investors to suffer harm as a result of misrepresentation
or non-disclosure of material information. Some commentators have
even noted that the regulatory environment with respect to bitcoin is
akin to the “Wild West” facing investors prior to the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933. 361 This is supported by the fact that Bitcoin has
undergone a number of extreme and volatile price corrections. 362
356. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., Dion, supra note 240, at 192–93.
362. Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: Hearing on
the Virtual Currencies Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Congress 14 (2013) (statement of Jerry Brito), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
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Economists have noted that “these adjustments resemble traditional
speculative bubbles: overoptimistic media coverage of Bitcoin prompts
waves of novice investors to pump up Bitcoin prices.” 363 Although some
have suggested that these fluctuations will eventually decrease, their
recurrence and severity indicate, at least, “an alignment in the purpose of
the Securities Act and the reality of the current bitcoin market” 364 In
short, the lack of regulation means that the sale of Bitcoin as an
investment is susceptible to puffery, nondisclosure of material
information, and even affirmative misrepresentation. Accordingly,
investments in Bitcoin raise the same potential for investors to be
defrauded or otherwise harmed by uninformed purchases of Bitcoin.
Therefore, the policy goals served by regulation of securities also
justifies the regulation of Bitcoin investments.
A conceptual difficulty arises, however, when considering how the
registration provisions of the Securities Act can be practically applied to
bitcoins that are created and distributed anonymously online instead of
purposefully issued by an individual or corporation, as is the case with
traditional securities. In order to avoid the complexities of requiring
dynamic online registration, most have again turned to regulation of
intermediaries as the solution, suggesting that bitcoin exchanges “be
forced to . . . . register with the SEC . . . . [and] file . . . public
reports . . . [thus] informing potential investors on the full reality of the
Bitcoin investment.” 365
Using Bitcoin exchanges as a “regulatory chokepoint,” could address
some of these concerns. It is unclear, however, whether such an
approach is appropriate. Unlike traditional securities, the value of a
bitcoin is not controlled directly by a central authority nor is there a
group of “inside traders” that might benefit from specialized knowledge
of the service. 366 Rather, the value of a bitcoin is determined entirely
based upon what the market will bear in relation to other currencies. 367
In that respect, Bitcoin could be viewed as more akin to foreign currency

download/?id=0dcd748d-035a-4c0f-b695-7680adc2425d (“Bitcoin has weathered at least five
significant price adjustments since 2011.”).
363. Id.; see also Timothy B. Lee, An Illustrated History of Bitcoin Crashes, FORBES (Apr. 11,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04/11/an-illustrated-history-of-bitcoin-crashes;
Felix Salmon, The Bitcoin Bubble and the Future of Currency, MEDIUM (Apr. 3, 2013),
https://medium.com/money-banking/2b5ef79482cb.
364. See, e.g., Dion, supra note 240, at 193.
365. Id. at 194.
366. Id. at 167.
367. Id.
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which is, generally, exempt from U.S. securities law. 368
Despite some of the above-noted similarities between bitcoin and
traditional investments, Bitcoin possesses distinctly different
characteristics that may impede the extension of existing securities law
requirements to the virtual currency context. Because the goal of having
informed investment decisions underlying federal securities laws
justifies regulation of virtual currency, policymakers seeking to create a
virtual currency framework must identify modified or alternative
compliance requirements that serve the same purpose while being
specifically tailored to virtual currency.
E.

Federal Banking Law

“Banking is among the world’s most heavily regulated industries.” 369
Among other requirements, banks and their boards must obtain a license
and administrative approval prior to formation, meet statutorily
prescribed capital and reserve requirements, abide by strict operational
and corporate governance standards when they operate, and maintain
compliance with a host of consumer protection and anti-discrimination
laws. 370
Although Bitcoin does not necessarily fall within the common
definition of a “bank,” 371 the continued growth of Bitcoin as a viable
payment system may soon make comparisons between the two
increasingly appropriate. Because Bitcoin is touted as a competitor and
alternative to the heavily-regulated traditional financial system
dominated by banks, the regulation of banks provides useful guidance in
the development and creation of a virtual currency regulatory regime.
This is particularly true if decentralized virtual currencies ultimately
achieve a level of near universal acceptance such that it would rival the
importance of the banking industry. While the regulatory objectives
served by banking regulation do not presently incite the same degree of
concern in the context of virtual currency, the continued growth of
decentralized virtual currency may subsequently necessitate regulationspecific virtual currency regulation aimed at advancing the same goals as
current banking laws.
368. See id. at 177 (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1280
n.4 (S.D. Ohio 1996)).
369. RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 53 (4th ed. 2009).
370. See id.
371. Id. at 35 (“We might . . . . define a bank . . . as a firm that accepts deposits withdrawable by
check and makes loans.”).
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Policy Goals of Bank Regulation

It has often been suggested that banks are “special” institutions
distinguishable “from all other classes of institutions both financial and
nonfinancial” and, therefore, should be subject to similarly unique
regulation. 372 Three characteristics of banks are usually identified in
support of this view: (a) the fact that unregulated banks are susceptible
to runs and panics, (b) “their role in creating and destroying money,” and
(c) “their custodianship of the payment system.” 373 In short, these
features combine to make the banking system “too big to fail.” Stated
another way, the United States’ banking system is of unmatched
importance because a bank failure commonly results in significant
external costs on society, not just harm to the bank and its customers.
Accordingly, a stringent regulatory regime governs the banking industry
to prevent these undesirable results and to promote the safety and
soundness of the United States banking system. The following sections
briefly describe these characteristics of banks that have been presumed
to render them uniquely amenable to strict regulation and governmental
control.
a.

Susceptibility of Banks to Runs and Panics

The first justification commonly provided for regulation of the
banking system stems largely from the trauma that the U.S. economy
experienced in the run-up to the Great Depression. As some banks
experienced liquidity problems or even collapsed, a “contagion of fear”
and lack of trust in the financial system as a whole resulted in depositors
flocking to their banks and demanding that their money be returned. 374
Banks, however, were unable to sustain such a demand and the nation
experienced wave after wave of bank collapses.375
The reason that banks are uniquely susceptible to this type “panic” or
“run on the bank” has to do with two common banking practices: the use
of “transaction accounts from which the bank makes payments [to
depositors on demand]; and the fractional reserve system the bank uses
to make sure it has enough cash to honor those payments and other
withdrawals.” 376 “A transaction account is any account from which a
372. Id. at 57 (quoting E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis 1982 Annual Report (1982)).
373. Id. at 54.
374. Id. at 17.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 40.
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customer may withdraw money . . . . upon demand” and the fractional
reserve system used by nearly every bank is based upon the principle
that “banks need to keep only a fraction of total deposits on reserve as
cash and can expect . . . no more than a small percentage of deposits to
be withdrawn at any given time.” 377 The remainder of the deposits can
be maintained in the form of less liquid investments.
Taken together, these two elements of the modern banking system
ensure that, on any given day, if every customer who maintains an
account at a bank demanded the return of the entire balance of their
account, the bank would be incapable of meeting all of the demands.
Thus, should even a small group of customers begin to lose confidence
in their bank, “each depositor [would have] . . . an individual selfinterest in joining the run [because] . . . . depositors at the front of the
line will receive full payment while depositors at the end . . . risk partial
or total loss” all but ensuring a collapse of the institution. 378
In order to guard against this inherent risk of collapse, regulations
have been promulgated to ensure that banks provide their customers with
deposit insurance (often administered through the FDIC) to assure them
that the value of their deposits will be safe even if the bank fails.379
Moreover, certain “safety and soundness” requirements have been
imposed to require, amongst other things, that banks maintain a
minimum level of capital. 380
b.

The Role of Banks in the Creation and Destruction of Money

Another common justification for regulation of the banking industry
is the fact that banks directly impact the total supply of money available
in the national economy. Stated simply, banks have the ability to
increase the money supply by virtue of making loans.
Because banks are only required to keep a fraction of total deposits in
reserve, a certain portion can be given to another customer in the form of
a loan, which gives banks an avenue for making a profit.381 Each loan
functions, in a sense, to increase the total money supply available in the
economy. 382 The original depositor of the funds may still demand the
377. Id. at 42.
378. Id. at 46–47.
379. See, e.g., Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of
Its Antecedents and Its Purposes, 75 Pol. Sci. Q. 181–200 (1960).
380. See 12 C.F.R. § 364.100 (2014).
381. JOHN A. TATOM, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION: LEGISLATION AND IMPLICATIONS 5
(2009).
382. Jon Carney, Basics of Banking: Loans Create a Lot More Than Deposits, CNBC (Feb. 26,
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withdrawal of the deposited funds at any time, but those same funds can
simultaneously be used by the customer who received the loan from the
bank. 383 As the borrower repays the loan, that “created” money is
“destroyed” (it can no longer be used by the debtor, only the depositor or
the bank). 384 However, should the debtor never repay the loan, the bank
has in effect increased the amount of currency available for use in the
financial system. 385
In this way, as a matter of course, banks “create” and “destroy”
money. The relationship between banks and the money supply has
important consequences for public policy and impacts the overall health
of the economy. 386 For example, “many economists believe that the 1933
collapse of the U.S. banking system exacerbated the Great Depression
by massively contracting the money supply.” 387 As such, advocates of
stringent financial regulation argue, the aspects of banking that implicate
the nation’s money supply should be controlled in order to ensure their
alignment with the public interest in a stable monetary policy. 388
c.

The Role of Banks in the Payment System

A final justification provided for the extensive regulation of banks in
the United States is the “special role [banks play] . . . in operating the
U.S. payment system—the system for transferring wealth through
bookkeeping entries, notably by clearing checks and transmitting
electronic payments.” 389 It is this system that allows a check deposited in
one bank to be efficiently transferred to another. Should this payment
system break down, there is “the potential for widespread . . . disrupt[ion] [to] the economy.” 390 Thus, in order to ensure a
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100497710; Michael McLeay, Amar Radia, & Ryland Thomas,
Money Creation in the Modern Economy, BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL., Quarter 1 2014, at 16,
available
at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/
qb14q102.pdf.
383. Carney, supra note 382; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, supra note 382, at 16; CARNELL,
MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 40–42; TATOM, supra note 381, at 5.
384. Carney, supra note 382; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, supra note 382, at 16; CARNELL,
MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 40–42; TATOM, supra note 381, at 5.
385. Carney, supra note 382; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, supra note 382, at 16; CARNELL,
MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 40–42; TATOM, supra note 381, at 5.
386. CARNELL, MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 50.
387. Id.
388. See Carney, supra note 382; McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, supra note 382, at 18; CARNELL,
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 369, at 54; TATOM, supra note 381, at 5.
389. CARNELL, MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 50; see also TATOM, supra note 381, at 5.
390. CARNELL, MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 51.
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healthy payments system, advocates of regulation argue, banks must be
prohibited from engaging in disruptive or risky business practices that
might hinder the efficiency of the payment system. 391
2.

Application to Virtual Currency

Ultimately, the justification for regulation of banks centers on the fact
that bank failure “can have significant external costs (e.g., on depositors,
borrowers, and local communities)” that extend beyond the bank and its
customers. 392 If a bank fails or loses the trust of its customers, the
national payment system suffers, a run on banks occurs, “[e]nterprises
are stopped[,] [b]usiness is brought to a standstill[,] [f]oreclosures occur
[and] . . . . [p]roperty is sacrificed.” 393 As such, when assessing whether
regulation of Bitcoin is justified on the basis of the policy goals of
banking laws, it is important to assess whether Bitcoin imposes similar
external costs on society. The following sections will consider whether
Bitcoin, like banks, can be viewed as “special” and will identify lessons
that can be taken from the regulatory objectives of banking laws to
develop effective virtual currency regulation.
a.

Is Bitcoin Susceptible to Runs or Panics?

The failure of the Japan-based Bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, indicates
that bitcoin exchanges operate in a manner similar to traditional banks
with respect to “runs” or “panics.” In 2014, an online attack on the
exchanges’ currency reserves triggered what came to known as “a digital
age bank run.” 394 In response, Mt. Gox froze the accounts of its
customers and “refus[ed] to give customers their . . . [bitcoins] back.” 395
Customers were, however, still permitted to “trade the Bitcoins in their
accounts for other currencies” and in their fear that they might only
receive partial repayment of their initial investment “panicked customers
carried out $32M USD of transactions on the site, nearly five times the
normal daily volume.” 396

391. Id. at 51–52; see also TATOM, supra note 381, at 5.
392. CARNELL, MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 55.
393. Id. at 55 (quoting Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (Kan. 1911)); see also TATOM, supra
note 381, at 5.
394. Jason Mick, Mt. Gox Bitcoin Bank Run Intensifies, 1 Million Customers at Risk,
DAILYTECH.COM (Feb. 7, 2014, 1:04 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/Mt+Gox+Bitcoin+Bank+
Run+Intensifies+1+Million+Customers+at+Risk/article34293.htm.
395. Id.
396. Id.
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Of course, the “digital run” on the Mt. Gox exchange did not have the
same impact as the run on the banks that precipitated the Great
Depression. It implicated only $460 million worth of bitcoins and other
exchanges began to distance themselves from Mt. Gox, preventing a
cascading effect. 397 However, should Bitcoin become a true competitor
to government backed currencies or should traditional banks begin to
invest in the virtual currency, protections against runs may need to be
implemented. In fact, some have suggested that Bitcoin should be
required to adopt insurance comparable to that of the FDIC else they
“risk losing everything in bank runs.” 398
b.

Is Bitcoin Involved in the Creation and Destruction of Money?

Bitcoin does not create money in the same way as banks because
loans are not made in connection with a fractional reserve system.
Accordingly, Bitcoin does not pose precisely the same regulatory
concerns. However, Bitcoin could be viewed as adding currency to the
money supply in a broader sense. As discussed briefly above, bitcoins
are created through a process of “mining” (or the decryption of online
Bitcoin transactions by bitcoin users). The process of mining is slow and
ensures that bitcoins are “created at a predictable and decreasing rate—
automatically halving over time until issuance halts with a total of 21
million bitcoins in existence.” 399 Thus, although the Bitcoin service
cannot be said to maintain a fractional reserve, the “mining” process
may create a somewhat similar result. Some bitcoins are exchanged for
traditional currencies but other are simply created, through the mining
process, in a manner that is in some ways comparable to the money
created when a bank extends a loan without additional physical currency
to back its value. As such, should Bitcoin grow in popularity and begin
to be more commonly accepted as a form of currency, mining may have
a direct impact on the total money supply and might justify bank-like
regulation on those grounds. Even so, the differing type and level risk
posed by Bitcoin at this time does not appear to support the conclusion
that Bitcoin should be regulated like banks on the basis of their
similarity in ability to create money.

397. Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, WIRED
(Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
398. Mick, supra note 394.
399. Matthew J. Belvedere, Big Bitcoin Selling Point Not Set in Stone: Mine, CNBC (Apr. 7,
2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101560477.
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The Role of Bitcoin in the Payment System

At the present stage of its development, Bitcoin cannot be said to be
central to the payment system, which is still dominated by traditional
banks. However, one could imagine a payment system that operates
independently of any bank. 400 In fact, Bitcoin advocates Cameron and
Tyler Winklevoss have already envisioned such a system, arguing that
the Bitcoin’s true benefit is what it has to offer “in terms of payments,
[because] it [i]s a transaction free, borderless global payments
system . . . . Bitcoin can send 50 cents across the world and with the
traditional system you can’t do that.” 401 Should the Winklevoss’ vision
of a Bitcoin-based payment system be realized, Bitcoin might displace
banks as the dominant player in the payments system and, thereby,
necessitate further regulation to ensure the health of that system.
However, such a result does not appear supported at present because
Bitcoin has yet to achieve, and realistically may never achieve, a level of
acceptance that its failure as a payment system would have a crippling
effect on the economy.
In sum, evaluating the regulatory goals of banking regulation and the
other laws discussed in this Part IV facilitates a broader discussion of the
unique risks of virtual currency and how best to regulate it. A number of
lessons can be extracted from this process. First, it is clear that virtual
currency implicates a spectrum of considerations that span a number of
different existing frameworks. As such, the regulation of virtual
currency appears justified on the basis of the legitimate goals of existing
currency, payments, financial services, banking, and investment laws.
Moreover, the need for interagency communication and a global
perspective is intensified. Second, despite sharing similar regulatory
considerations, virtual currency often creates a distinctly different level
of concern (potentially greater than or lower than the original subject of
regulation). Additionally, the unique aspects of virtual currency often
make existing regulatory requirements ill-suited for extension.
Therefore, policymakers can use regulatory goals and compliance
requirements of existing law as a starting point, but will likely need to
modify or create new methods of regulating virtual currency in order to
advance the same regulatory goals in the context of virtual currency.
Taken together, this process provides a mechanism for (1) thinking more
400. See CARNELL, MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 369, at 51.
401. Robert England, Winkelvoss Interview: Bitcoin Payment System Worth $400 Billion,
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/040814/
winklevoss-bitcoin-payment-system-worth-400-billion.asp.
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globally about all the pieces that may make up an effective system of
virtual currency regulation, and (2) encouraging both communication
and collaboration between the various regulatory stakeholders.
CONCLUSION
Decentralized virtual currency blurs the lines between traditional
financial services, payment systems, and investment regulation. The
innovative nature of virtual currency has allowed it to be used in many
ways that resemble products and services that are subject to existing
regulatory regimes. Virtual currency, however, is an entirely new
medium of payment and investment. Like other technological
innovations, Bitcoin brings novel regulatory challenges and places
pressure on established regulatory frameworks that were developed to
respond to other recognized forms. 402
These challenges are nothing new. Regulation often lags behind the
rapid growth of a new technology such that early entrants enjoy what has
been called the “lawlessness of new frontiers” (or a low level of
regulation) as the law catches up to the new public policy challenges that
are created, 403 often prompting the need to reassess legal and regulatory
frameworks that do not fit. 404 For example, legislators, regulators, and
the judiciary struggled to develop a model for regulation of the Internet
in the mid-1990s. 405 Like the virtual currency discussed here, certain
legal issues arising from the Internet could potentially be managed with
existing law 406 while other unique regulatory concerns were incapable of
reconciliation by the simple application of existing approaches from
related industries. 407 Although Bitcoin is unlikely to ever have the same
degree of transformational impact as the internet, this example illustrates
a path forward.
402. See Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap, 35
B.C. L. REV. 1067, 1090 (1994) (noting that the “[e]mergence of a new . . . medium generates
significant pressure upon established regulatory regimes conditioned to respond to recognized forms
and experiences”).
403. See Steven R. Salbu, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH 429, 431 (1998) (citing T.R. Goldman, How
Microsoft Gets Its Way in Washington, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at 1).
404. Id. at 430–31 (discussing “unprecedented” issues raised by the Internet).
405. Id.
406. See Mark L. Caden & Stephanie E. Lucas, Comment, Accidents on the Information
Superhighway: On-Line Liability and Regulation, 2 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 65 (1996); Nicholas
Robbins, Baby Needs a New Pair of Cybershoes: The Legality of Casino Gambling on the Internet,
2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, 31 (1996).
407. See David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 247 (1996).
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We have argued that the regulation of Bitcoin is justified on the basis
of its propensity to raise the similar regulatory concerns as those that
prompted the enactment of several existing laws. Though the degree of
risk may differ, the legitimate policy goals of these laws would be
served to some degree by regulating decentralized virtual currency.
However, we have also shown that the mere extension of laws crafted to
respond to the risks presented by established payment systems, financial
services, and investment vehicles tend to be insufficient to control the
same dangers when they are transferred to the online world of virtual
currency. Accordingly, we contend that current efforts in the U.S., which
can be characterized generally as pursuing such a limited approach to
clarifying the treatment of virtual currency under existing frameworks,
runs the risk of coming up short.
Instead of narrowly focusing on the technical question of whether and
how an existing law applies to virtual currency, we encourage a more
holistic approach. Specifically, we contend that the development of an
efficient regulatory regime necessitates greater interagency
communication about the spectrum of regulatory considerations raised
by virtual currency and the pursuit of cohesive (if not unified) action. To
that end, we posit that there is much to learn from: (1) divesting from
attempts to define or conceptualize virtual currency via established
constructs for payment systems or investment vehicles, and (2)
evaluating the policy goals (not the statutory language) of existing law
as applied to the unique nuances of virtual currency. In doing so,
policymakers can identify the considerations unique to virtual currency
and develop appropriate regulatory requirements to mitigate the actual
risks raised by virtual currency free from self-imposed constraints.
It seems relevant to note in conclusion that this analysis does not seek
to downplay the risks or opportunities presented by novel virtual
currencies such as Bitcoin, nor does it seek to advocate for a particular
regulatory response. Rather, it merely suggests that by avoiding an
unnecessarily narrow debate constrained by the limits of presently
existing regulatory structures and language, a more workable,
comprehensive, and cohesive regulatory regime for virtual currencies
might be forged.

